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ABSTRACT
This dissertation reports research conducted in two aspects of secure net-
work resource management: strengthening security by proposing a defense
architecture with stronger security property and increasing deployability. In
the rst part of this dissertation, we reveal a new threat called false feedback
attack in wireless networks using channel-aware protocols. Our simulations
show that an attacker overclaiming its channel condition is able to com-
pletely steal other benign users' service opportunity under a high-eciency
scheduler. A fair scheduler can mitigate this attack but cannot provide high
eciency. We propose a new secure channel estimation scheme to maintain
security while achieving high eciency at the same time. Our analysis and
simulations show that our scheme prohibits any incentive for an attacker per-
forming false feedback attack and gives higher throughput than PF scheduler,
a representative fair scheduler. In the second part, we present CRAFT, a
collusion-resistant DoS (denial of service) defense. CRAFT defends against a
colluding receiver who intentionally allows a colluding sender to send exces-
sive trac. Our basic idea is that a CRAFT router securely emulates TCP
operation. Our simulations show that CRAFT guarantees service availability
even with colluding attackers. Our prototype system shows the feasibility of
CRAFT. In the third part, we present Mirage, a deployable DoS defense.
Prior defenses require other network operators to deploy the same defense
mechanism. Mirage does not impose this requirement. Our analysis and pro-
totype system show that Mirage does not require other network operators'
deployment and is feasible with commodity PCs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In modern networks, people use various types of networking services such as
web, P2P or IM service. Since a network resource (e.g. network bandwidth or
time slots) is shared by many dierent users, a network protocol is necessary
to allocate the network resource to each user by a criterion. For example,
when we want to distribute a shared network bandwidth to multiple users, a
congestion control algorithm is necessary. The most representative example
of congestion control algorithm is TCP [1].
For implementation of modern network devices ranging from general desk-
top computer to specic wireless device, a source code implementing the
functions of network devices is getting more accessible to more people as the
open source trend continues and the software part of a device gets larger [2{5].
This programmability requires us to reconsider resource management pro-
tocol's general assumption that each node follows the rules specied by a
protocol. For example, if someone wants to ood the bandwidth of a server,
they can easily nd an open software to do it.
In this context, the general framework of my thesis work is to explore what
will happen to a network in the presence of misbehaving nodes. In particular,
I focused on strengthening the security of a network system and improving
deployability of a defense mechanism. For stronger security, I tried to nd
a new threat which had not been considered before and consider a stronger
attack model for a known attack. For deployability, I tried to propose a
new defense which can provide an immediate benet to an adopter on the
Internet.
With these general directions, I addressed three particular research topics:
false feedback attacks in wireless networks, DoS (denial of dervice) defense
against colluding link-ooding attacks and deployable DoS defense in the In-
ternet. In Chapter 2, I present analysis of and a defense mechanism against
false feedback attacks on channel-aware protocols in wireless networks. In
1
Chapter 3, I present CRAFT which is a strong DoS defense architecture
against colluding attackers. In Chapter 4, I present Mirage which is a de-
ployable DoS defense architecture in the Internet. Chapter 5 concludes this
dissertation.
2
CHAPTER 2
FALSE FEEDBACK ATTACK ON
CHANNEL-AWARE PROTOCOLS IN
WIRELESS NETWORKS
In this chapter, I consider the management of time slot in wireless networks.
I assume that each user in a network shares the same frequency or code space
and a scheduler assigns time slots to each user. I introduce a new type of
threat called false feedback attack in wireless networks. I present an analysis
of the eectiveness of false feedback attack and a defense mechanism against
the attack. This work is the result of a collaboration with Prof. Yih-Chun
Hu.
2.1 Introduction
Many protocols in modern wireless networks treat a link's channel condition
information as a protocol input parameter; I call such protocols channel-
aware. Examples include cooperative relaying network architectures [6, 7],
ecient ad hoc network routing metrics [8, 9] and opportunistic schedulers
[10, 11]. Even though each dierent application exploits user-equipment re-
ported channel-condition information in dierent ways, the main goal of a
channel-aware protocol is to enhance system throughput. For example, in
a setting where a scheduler assigns a user to a time slot, maximum sys-
tem throughput can be obtained by serving a user with the best channel
condition in every time slot. Unfortunately, this scheduler, while providing
system-wide optimality, might exclude users with poor channel condition. A
representative example of a fair channel-aware scheduler is the Proportional
Fair (PF) scheduler [10]. The PF scheduler provides fairness by comparing a
user's current channel condition with the user's recent system performance.
In future sections, I analyze the PF scheduler as a case study.
Work on channel-aware protocols has mainly focused on how channel condi-
tion information can be used to make more ecient use of wireless resources.
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However, security aspects of using channel condition information have not
yet been well studied. A major security risk of channel-aware protocols is
the asymmetry of channel conditions. Because channel conditions can be
asymmetric [12], channel condition to a user can only be measured and re-
ported by that user. Ensuring that this reporting is accurate is therefore a
critical component for attack-resilience of channel-aware protocols. An im-
plicit assumption of the past studies is that user equipment correctly reports
its channel condition. However, as the incentives for misreporting grow and
as user equipment becomes more programmable (thus providing more means
for an attacker to inject false feedback), we need to revisit this assumption.
Our work investigates the eectiveness of false feedback on possible attacker
goals, such as reducing overall bandwidth or increasing attacker performance.
In this chapter, I present the possible eects of false channel condition re-
porting in various channel-aware network protocols and a defense mechanism
that provides secure channel condition estimation. Our contributions are:
 We analyze specic attack mechanisms and evaluate the eects of mis-
reported channel condition on various channel-aware wireless network
protocols including cooperative relaying protocols, routing metrics in
wireless ad-hoc network and opportunistic schedulers.
 We propose a secure channel condition estimation algorithm that is
generally applicable to any channel-aware protocol.
 We analyze our algorithm in the terms of performance and security,
and we perform a simulation study to understand the impact of our
algorithm on overall system performance.
The false channel condition reporting attack that I introduce in this chap-
ter is dicult to identify by existing mechanisms, since our attack is mostly
protocol compliant; an attacker needs to modify only the channel-condition
measurement mechanism. Our attack can thus be performed using modied
user equipment legitimately registered to a network.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to generally study the false
reporting of channel condition. Racic et al. [13] consider an attack where
channel condition is falsely reported to a PF scheduler. However, their attack
primarily works by exploiting the handover process rather than the channel-
4
aware nature of PF scheduler. They propose a secure handover algorithm
that is orthogonal to our approach of secure channel condition estimation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I dis-
cuss the concept of our attack and perform case studies of various channel-
aware networking protocols, evaluating through simulation the eect of a
false channel condition reporting attacker. Then, I present a defense mech-
anism called secure channel condition estimation against the false reporting
attack in Section 2.3. I evaluate our algorithm through analysis and simula-
tion in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, I briey review related works. Section 2.6
summarizes this chapter.
2.2 Attack
In this section, I introduce our attack concept and perform case studies to
quantize the attack eects on specic channel-aware network protocols.
2.2.1 Attack Concept and Feasibility
Our study assumes that a network protocol exploits channel condition infor-
mation of each user to enhance network performance and each user reports
its own channel condition. In this setting, a user can falsely report its chan-
nel condition. There are two dierent types of false reports: underclaim-
ing (reporting its channel condition as worse than actual measurement) and
overclaiming (reporting its channel condition as better than actual measure-
ment). The eectiveness of false channel condition reporting attack depends
on how the attacker structures their underclaiming and overclaiming actions.
In case studies of this section, I examine how to structure these two actions
to attack specic protocols under selsh or malicious purposes of an attacker.
An attacker can easily implement false channel condition reporting at-
tack by modifying only a subcomponent to report channel condition. This
subcomponent of a user's equipment can be implemented in hardware or
software. One recent trend of user equipment implementation is to move
more functionality into software in order to improve adaptability [3{5]. The
increasing software control of user equipment makes false channel condition
reporting attack an increasingly practical attack.
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2.2.2 Case Studies
I evaluate the eect of falsely reported channel condition under three types of
channel-aware protocols: cooperative relaying protocols in hybrid networks,
ecient routing metrics in wireless ad hoc networks, and opportunistic sched-
ulers in high-speed wireless networks. For each protocol, we suggest possible
attack mechanisms and quantify the eectiveness of the attack. We show
that we can defend against some attacks using existing algorithms, and that
other attacks require new security mechanisms. I present each case study as
follows. First, I briey explain the protocols. Then, I discuss eective attack
scenarios for each protocol. Finally, I use simulations to evaluate the eect
of each attack scenario.
2.2.3 Cooperative Relaying
In a mobile wireless network, mobile nodes can experience dierent channel
conditions due to their dierent locations. Though a node experiences a chan-
nel condition too poor to receive packets from a source node, a third node
may have a good channel condition to both the source and the intended des-
tination. Cooperative relaying network architectures (e.g., [6,7,14,15]) help a
node that has poor channel condition to route its packet through a node with
a good channel condition, thus improving system throughput. In order to
nd such routes, a cooperative relaying protocol must distribute channel con-
dition information for each candidate path, nd the most appropriate relay
path, and provide incentives to motivate nodes to forward packets for other
nodes. Specically, in UCAN [7], user equipment has two wireless adaptors,
one High Data Rate (HDR) cellular interface and one IEEE 802.11 interface.
The HDR interface is used for communication with a base station and the
IEEE 802.11 interface is used for peer-to-peer communication with other user
equipment in a network.
Attack. For simplicity, I discuss single-hop relaying even though our attack
easily extends to multi-hop routes. Cooperative relaying architectures can
take on various forms, but they all need to know the genuine channel con-
dition of each candidate relaying node to nd the most appropriate relaying
node. The main purpose of cooperative relaying is to maximize system e-
ciency, so the route with best channel condition is likely to be chosen. When
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Table 2.1: block size (bits) for channel condition
cqi block cqi block cqi block cqi block cqi block
1 137 2 173 3 233 4 317 5 377
6 461 7 650 8 792 9 931 10 1262
11 1483 12 1742 13 2279 14 2583 15 3319
16 3565 17 4189 18 4664 19 5287 20 5887
21 6554 22 7168 23 7168 24 7168 25 7168
26 7168 27 7168 28 7168 29 7168 30 7168
a node underclaims its channel condition, the node reduces its probability
of being chosen for forwarding; the underclaiming attack is thus no worse
than powering the node o. As a result, underclaiming is not an eective
attack against cooperative relaying. I examine through simulation the eect
of an overclaiming attack. If an attacker overclaims its channel condition, the
attacker is more likely to be chosen as the best candidate for relaying. Desig-
nating the attacker as a relaying node provides the attacker an opportunity
to steal the packets or to adversely impact network performance.
Evaluation. I performed a simulation study to evaluate the overclaiming
attack's eect on the normal users' performance in a cooperative relaying
environment. I quantify normal users' performance with and without the
attack. I use the ns-2 simulator [16] patched with EURANE [17], a UMTS
system simulator. Our simulated network consists of one base station serving
four users. The base station sends 11Mbps of constant bit rate (CBR) trac
to each user. There is one attacker who may falsely report its channel con-
dition to the base station. I represent channel condition using the channel
quality indicator (CQI) dened in the 3GPP standard [18].
CQI =
8><>:
0 SINR  -16dB
bSINR
1:02
+ 16:62c -16dB < SINR < 14dB
30 SINR  14dB
Table 2.1 shows the transmission block sizes for each corresponding CQI.
The same equation and table are also used for a case study on an opportunis-
tic scheduler presented in Section 2.2.5. I assume that one victim is close
to the attacker so that when the victim experiences poor channel condition,
the victim can use the attacker as a relaying node. The other two normal
users get packets directly from the base station and do not participate the
7
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Figure 2.1: Case study of cooperative relaying network.
cooperative relaying protocol. The victim and the two normal users honestly
report their channel condition. The channel for the attacker and two normal
users uses a shadowing plus Rayleigh model of a moving node 100m away
from the base station with velocity of 3km/h. I vary the victim's distance to
the base station from 100m to 500m to see the eect of the victim's channel
condition on the performance degradation.
The attacker's goal in this simulation is to reduce the victim's throughput.
The attacker can adopt two approaches. In the conservative approach, the
attacker does not forward packets for the victim, and the attacker reports
its true channel condition. In the aggressive approach, the attacker over-
claims its channel condition so that the attacker can increase its probability
of relaying packets for the victim.
Our simulations do not consider the overhead that an actual relaying pro-
tocol might incur in nding a new relaying node due to channel condition
variation since such overhead is not related to the eect of attack. I assume
that each transmission uses an orthogonal carrier so that transmissions do
not interfere with each other. Our simulations do not implement a relay dis-
covery protocol; rather, I compare the attacker and victim CQI, and use the
link with better CQI value to transmit to the victim. This relaying scheme
is an example; a system operator may choose a dierent scheme. However,
the scheme that I chose is good for exploiting increased diversity to optimize
throughput [7]. I ran each of our simulations for 100 simulated seconds.
I measure the received throughput of the victim as shown in Figure 2.1(b).
`No Relay/No Attack' represents the original UMTS system conguration
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with single hop transmission. `Relay/No Attack' represents the attacker
node relaying packets for the victim node whenever the attacker has a better
channel condition than the victim node. I can see that when the victim uses
the route with better condition, the system experiences improved through-
put. `Relay/No Overclaiming/Dropping' represents the attacker's conserva-
tive approach. As the victim node gets farther from the base station, the
reduction in the victim's throughput increases due to the increased probabil-
ity that the attacker's channel condition is better than the victim's channel
condition. `Relay/Overclaiming/Dropping' represents the case in which the
attacker overclaims its channel condition, either by 1 or 2 CQI levels. By
comparing these results to the `No Overclaiming' case, I can see how often
an attacker's overclaiming allows it to steal the forwarding opportunity. Our
results show that even with a small amount of overclaiming, the attacker can
steal many packets. Though I have only shown results for a single sample
protocol, and an actual system may use a dierent protocol, I believe that
the attack of falsely reporting the channel condition can have a harmful eect
on the network even with a small amount of overclaiming.
2.2.4 Ecient Routing Metrics in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
A wireless ad hoc network supports communication between nodes without
need for centralized infrastructure such as base stations or access points. To
deliver packets to destinations beyond a source node's transmission range,
the source employs the help of intermediate nodes to forward each packet to
its destination. Routing protocols in wireless ad hoc network discover routes
between nodes (e.g. [19{21]). When there are multiple valid routes from
a source to a destination, a routing protocol needs to choose among valid
routes. A routing metric is a value associated with a route and represents
the desirability of a route. A typical metric in the seminal routing protocols
is minimum hop count. The rationale behind the metric of minimum hop
count is that a route with fewer hops allows a packet to be delivered with the
smaller number of transmissions. Hence, the metric of minimum hop count
can reduce the total energy consumption across all network nodes as long as
nodes do not perform power or rate adaptation.
However, the metric of minimum hop count may have an adverse eect on
9
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Figure 2.2: Case study of ecient routing metric.
the number of transmissions due to the characteristics of wireless channel.
Each hop in a route with minimum hop count is likely to cover a long distance.
In a wireless channel, transmissions over longer distance are less likely to be
successful. Hence, a route with minimum hop count can actually increase
the number of transmissions. To address these shortcomings, researchers
have proposed dierent channel-aware routing metrics. One example is the
expected transmission count (ETX) metric proposed by Couto et al. [8]. Their
paper denes ETX as follows:
The ETX of a link is the predicted number of data transmissions
required to send a packet over that link, including retransmis-
sions. The ETX of a route is the sum of the ETX for each link
in the route.
In a system using ETX, a node broadcasts probe packets to its neighbor
nodes. Each neighbor node reports to the original node the number of probe
packets that it received. By comparing the number of probe packets received
by each neighbor node to the total number of probe packets, a node estimates
channel condition to each neighbor node. ETX information can be used
dierently, depending on the routing protocol. I use ETX in DSR [20] for the
following simulations, though our attack concept is applicable to any routing
metric and any routing protocol that is based on the channel condition of
each link in the route.
Attack. To calculate the ETX of a route in the forward direction, a source
node needs to know the ETX of each link on the path in the forward direction.
(For simplicity, when I mention of the ETX of a link, I will always mean the
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ETX of the forward direction.) The upstream node of each link reports its
measured ETX to the source node. An intermediate node can overclaim by
reporting a smaller ETX or underclaim by reporting a larger ETX. When
an intermediate node underclaims, a source node is less likely to choose a
route through the intermediate node. Hence, as in cooperative relaying,
an underclaiming node can be considered a powered o node, which cannot
attack a network. In contrast, an intermediate node that overclaims increases
its probability of being chosen. Hence, an overclaiming node can maliciously
intercept packets. The eectiveness of a false ETX report depends on the
number of attackers in the route; a larger number of attackers on the same
route can reduce the ETX further, thus having a greater impact on a source
node's route selection.
Evaluation. I performed a simulation study to quantify the eect of falsely
reported ETX in a wireless ad hoc network. I implemented measurement
and reporting of ETX in DSR [20] in the ns-2 simulator; I chose DSR as
a representative routing protocol, but our attack generalizes to any metric-
based routing protocol. A detailed explanation of DSR is beyond the scope of
this chapter. I simulated a six-node network where a source node sends CBR
trac at a rate of 1.31 kbps to a destination node and the remaining nodes
forward packets. I use relatively low rate trac to eliminate congestion as a
factor in our results. I vary the number of attackers and measure the fraction
of data packets successfully delivered. Each attacker drops any packets it
receives for forwarding, so I can use the delivery ratio as a measure of the
frequency with which the attacker is selected for forwarding. I consider two
topologies; in the rst, nodes are randomly placed in a 600 by 600 rectangle,
and in the second, I x the location of the source and destination nodes and
randomly place the other nodes between them. With these two topologies,
I can see the eect of the topology on attack. I perform 100 runs for each
topology. Figure 2.2(b) shows the results. With the fully random topology,
the delivery ratio remains about 90 percent, regardless of the number of
attackers. With the partially random topology, the delivery ratio sharply
decreases with an increasing number of attackers. The two topologies have
diering results because an eective attack depends on two conditions. First,
an attacker must be on a valid route from a source to a destination. Second,
the fraction of intermediate hops that are attackers must be large enough for
the attackers to substantially impact the ETX of the route. With the fully
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random topology, these two conditions are not likely to be satised because
routes are relatively short (possibly one-hop at times). However, with the
partially random topology, well-located attackers can inict signicant harm
to the network. As the number of attackers increases, the attackers have
greater control of the ETX of a route.
2.2.5 Opportunistic Schedulers
An opportunistic scheduler [10, 11] is a centralized resource scheduler that
exploits the channel condition information of each user for ecient resource
management. Channel condition variation due to fading in wireless networks
induces dierent channel conditions for each user at each moment in time.
This is called multi-user diversity. One simple example of an opportunistic
scheduler is an eciency-oriented scheduler that allocates resources to only
the user with the best channel condition in a time slot. I call this scheduler
MAX-SINR. It is obvious that this scheduler achieves the maximum possible
system throughput. However, this scheduler may give so few opportunities
to a user with poor channel condition that it induces a fairness problem.
The Proportional Fair (PF) scheduler [10] is a widely known scheduler that
addresses the fairness problem. The PF scheduler collects channel condition
information from each user at each time slot t. The PF scheduler uses channel
condition feedback from each user to determine the transmission rate Ri(t)
for each user i by calculating metrics Ri(t)=Ti(t) for each user, where Ti(t)
is user i's average throughput calculated as(
(1  1=tc)Ti(t  1) + 1=tcRi(t) if user i is chosen
(1  1=tc)Ti(t  1) if user i is not chosen
and tc represents the time constant of a low pass lter. In each time slot, the
PF scheduler serves the user with the largest metric. I consider the eects of
the false channel condition reporting attack on these two schedulers, MAX-
SINR and PF.
Attack. An attacker's objective is to steal as many time slots as possible.
Against a MAX-SINR scheduler, the attacker can steal nearly all time slots
simply by reporting the best possible channel condition. However, against
a PF scheduler, the attacker is much more limited due to the fairness guar-
12
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Figure 2.3: Case study of opportunistic scheduler.
antee of the PF scheduler. With the PF scheduler, an attacker can steal
specic time slots by overclaiming its channel condition to be the best possi-
ble condition. However, in future time slots, the attacker is less likely to be
chosen since the attacker's increased average throughput (Ti(t)) causes the
attacker's metric (Ri(t)=Ti(t)) to decrease. Hence, even when overclaiming,
the attacker under PF scheduler cannot occupy many consecutive slots. To
obtain several consecutive time slots, an attacker can gradually increase the
amount of overclaiming instead of always claiming the best possible condi-
tion. However, as the attacker increases its claimed channel capacity, its
Ti(t) increases equally rapidly. Hence, it is dicult for an attacker under PF
scheduler to impose a signicant impact on network. This issue is also dis-
cussed by Racic et al. [13]. They maximize the eect of their false reporting
attack by exploiting the handover mechanism to reduce Ti(t). This attack
with handover is orthogonal to our work.
Evaluation. I performed a simulation study using opportunistic schedulers.
I use the ns-2 simulator [16] patched with EURANE [22], a UMTS system
simulator. Our simulated network consists of one base station serving several
users, half of which are attackers. The attackers choose a simple attack: over-
claiming their channel condition to be the best possible condition. The base
station reacts by choosing a high bit-rate modulation for each transmission
to any attacker, which can induce a high error rate when the actual channel
condition is poor. In EURANE's implementation, a node that is unable to
receive a packet would not send back an ack to the base station, triggering an
internal control mechanism in UMTS that stops any connection failing to ac-
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knowledge several contiguous transmissions. I modied the attacker to send
an ack for every received packet, whether or not that packet was received
without error. Our channel model for each user is shadowing plus Rayleigh
model, modeling a moving node with velocity of 3km/h. I sourced 11 Mbps
of CBR trac to each user. I simulate three scheduling policies: MAX-SINR,
PF, and Round Robin (RR). RR gives each user the exact same amount of
service opportunity by allocating the time slots to users in order. I vary the
number of users and measure both the total system throughput and normal
users' throughput for each of the three scheduling policies. In Figure 2.3(b),
the total system throughput is represented by the solid lines and the nor-
mal users' throughput is represented by the dotted lines. For MAX-SINR,
the attack's eect is severe as expected. The normal users' throughput is
almost zero when the number of users is at least 6. When there are 2 or
4 users, the normal users can get chances to be served since the attackers
cannot occupy all slots. When an attacker's queue is empty, the attacker
cannot occupy time slots even with overclaiming. In RR and PF, the normal
users' throughput is about half of the system throughput. This result shows
that falsely reporting CQI is not so harmful under RR and PF. This result
coincides with the result of the work of Racic et al. [13].
2.2.6 Summary
I performed three case studies to study the eectiveness of falsely reporting
channel condition. The simulation results show that in cooperative relay-
ing networks and wireless ad hoc networks using ETX as a routing metric,
overclaiming attacks can eectively harm the normal users' service. For op-
portunistic schedulers, the PF scheduler can eectively defend against over-
claiming attackers. Considering the context of each protocol, I discussed the
benet of underclaiming action. I concluded that in the context of our case
studies, underclaiming action does not give any benet to an attacker.
2.3 Defense
In this section, I discuss possible solutions for the false channel feedback at-
tack introduced in Section 2.2. I argue that to fundamentally defend against
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attacks that involve false channel condition reports, we need a scheme to se-
curely estimate channel condition. Then, I show our secure channel condition
estimation algorithm.
2.3.1 Solution Spectrum
To defend against an attack that misreports the channel condition, we can
use pre-existing mechanisms. One possible defense mechanism is anomaly
detection. Anomaly detection is a tool that monitors each user's performance
to identify attackers. A response mechanism then disconnects the attacker
from the network. Another possible defense mechanism is to mitigate the
attack through fair allocation of network resources. In the same way as the
PF scheduler is a fair opportunistic scheduler, we can devise a mechanism
that provides fairness guarantees regardless of reported channel condition for
cooperative relaying networks or wireless ad hoc network routing.
Even though these approaches can mitigate the eectiveness of the at-
tack, they have fundamental drawbacks. Anomaly detection mechanisms are
subject to detection errors, which could result in incorrect termination of a
normal user's service or failure to detect an attacker. When fairness is used
to reduce the eect of the attack, we frustrate the original goal of cooperative
relaying networks and ETX, which is to use resources most eciently. An
allocator considering fairness will substantially reduce the eciency when
compared to the original protocol, since fairness requires allocation of re-
sources to less-capable channels.
To more eectively prevent the false channel condition reporting attack,
we need a mechanism that does not impede the eciency of channel-aware
protocols even under the false reporting attack. We observe that the false
reporting attacks are possible because we allow a non-trustable entity to
report the channel condition. Our basic approach is to replace the channel-
condition reporting by non-trustable-entity with channel-condition estima-
tion by trustable-entity. In cooperative relaying networks and opportunistic
schedulers, the base station can be a trustable entity. In wireless ad-hoc
networks, the source node trying to establish a route to a destination is a
trustable entity (because it trusts itself). In this work, we do not develop
whole specic protocols for such networks; rather, we develop a generic al-
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gorithm that can be integrated into any channel-aware protocol. We leave
protocol integration and design as future work.
2.3.2 Secure Channel Condition Estimation
Our case studies and solution spectrum analysis motivate a scheme that
prevents an attacker from overclaiming its channel condition. In this section,
we present our secure channel estimation scheme to prevent an attacker from
overclaiming. We do not consider underclaiming because in our case studies,
an attacker gains no benet from underclaiming, and because an attacker
can always reduce its actual channel condition, for example by modifying his
antenna. We start by presenting the intuition of our approach.
Intuition. For convenience of presentation, we call the trustable entity a
\base station" and the non-trustable entity a \user." The base station's goal
is to securely and accurately estimate each user's channel condition. We rst
present our solution to a simplied problem in which a base station wants to
know whether or not a user experiences channel condition at least as good as
some specied SINR. To solve this simplied problem, the base station sends
a challenge to a user. This challenge is a packet that can be correctly decoded
with high probability only when the channel condition exceeds some specied
SINR. The challenge includes a value known only to the base station. Upon
receiving the challenge, a user returns the value in that challenge to the base
station, which can then compare the received value to the transmitted value.
The base station considers the channel condition to exceed the specied SINR
if and only if the received value is correct. This challenge mechanism prevents
a user with poorer channel condition than the specied SINR from correctly
decoding the challenge packet. Our channel condition estimation scheme
extends this single challenge scheme to multiple challenges in order to more
nely estimate the channel condition. In the following sections, we present
our secure channel condition estimation algorithm in detail.
System Model. We consider a network cell consisting of a base station and
N users served by the base station. N = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng denotes the set of all
users in the system. The base station estimates channel conditions of each
user in each time slot using L challenges. A time interval [dt   d; dt); t 2 Z
is called time slot t where d is the duration of a time slot. At each time
16
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Figure 2.4: Secure channel estimation.
slot t, the base station uses our channel condition estimation to determine
a user's channel condition as an element in a set E = fE1; E2; : : : ; EL+1g
with cardinality L + 1. Each element Ei 2 E represents an SINR range of
SINRi 1  SINR < SINRi, where SINR0 =  1 and SINRL+1 =1.
Construction of Challenges. In our scheme, the base station sends chal-
lenges to users so that users cannot overclaim their channel condition. To
prevent the overclaiming attack, a challenge must have the following proper-
ties: unpredictability of the value included in a challenge and a well-designed
success probability curve of the challenge. If a user receiving a challenge is
able to guess the challenge value, the user can return the correct value even
without successfully decoding the challenge. To make the challenge value
unpredictable, we use a pseudorandom number generator.
To make a challenge that can be successfully decoded only by users with
channel condition above a specied SINR, the success probability curve of
a challenge must be appropriately designed. The ideal success probability
curve would have zero success probability for channel condition worse than a
specied SINR and zero error probability for channel condition better than
that specied SINR as shown in Figure 2.4(a). The dotted lines represent the
success probability of reception of challenges according to SINR. With these
ideal challenges, the successful reception of a challenge ci and the failure of the
reception of ci+1 implies that a given channel condition is SINRi  SINR <
SINRi+1. We could then estimate the channel condition as Ei+1. These ideal
challenges enable us to easily and accurately estimate the channel condition
with only a single transmission. However, ideal challenges require innitely
large challenges. Our scheme considers non-ideal challenges, as shown in
Figure 2.4(b). For each challenge ci, a node with channel condition as the
threshold SINRi for that challenge will successfully decode the challenge with
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probability Psref(i). Even though the shapes of the success probabilities of
each challenge look same in Figure 2.4(b), our scheme does not require the
shape of each success probability to be the same. We discuss the choice of
Psref(i) for the optimal performance in Section 2.4.1.
An immediate method to construct multiple challenges having appropriate
success probability is to use dierent modulation and coding techniques for
each challenge. However, from a practical point of view, a particular system
may not provide various modulation and coding options. In such cases, we
need a method to construct challenges with the limited number of modu-
lation and coding options available. In order to not interrupt the ow of
presentation, we explain such methods in more detail in Section 2.3.3.
Transmission of Challenges. The base station periodically broadcasts a
set of challenges to users. The period is one parameter of our scheme. One
extreme is to send a set of challenges in a single time slot, which allows
rapid channel condition estimation and can respond to rapid variations in
channel condition. However, sending so many challenges results in signicant
overhead. In an environment where the channel condition is slowly changing,
we can reduce the frequency with which a base station sends challenges.
Estimation. After the base station transmits a challenge to a user, the user
returns the challenge value to the base station to prove that the channel to
the user is good enough to receive the corresponding challenge. When the
base station receives the value from the user, the base station checks that
the value is identical to the one that it sent. Then, the base station stores
the result of this check. We denote a check result for challenge ci at time slot
t by Fi(t).
Fi(t) =
(
0 if challenge ci failed
1 if challenge ci succeeded
With ideal challenges, only a single set of check results is enough to esti-
mate channel condition. Since our scheme uses non-ideal challenges, we need
multiple sets of check results to reduce the error in the estimated channel
condition. We call the set used for estimating channel condition a window,
and we denote the window size as W . Intuitively, a larger window size re-
sults in more accurate estimated channel condition but slower adaptation. In
Section 2.4.1, we theoretically analyze the impact of window size on the per-
formance of our algorithm. When a base station nishes collecting a window
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of check results Fi(t  W + 1); : : : ; Fi(t);8i 2 f1; : : : ; Lg at time slot t, the
base station sums the check results for each challenge ci; 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Lg
as follows.
Si(t) =
W 1X
j=0
Fi(t  j) 8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Lg
Based on the values of Si(t), the base station estimates channel condition
using a decision function D. In other words, the base station decides which
element in the set E = fE1; E2; : : : ; EL+1g most accurately characterizes
corresponding user's channel condition. We denote the estimated channel
condition at time slot t by Ec(t).
Ec(t) = D(S1(t); S2(t); : : : ; SL(t))
We use a simple threshold-based comparison for our decision functionD. Fig-
ure 2.4(c) shows the comparison procedure. We choose a threshold T 2 [0; 1].
First, we see how any of the lowest rate challenges (c1s) are successfully re-
ceived by a user; it is likely that nearly all of these challenges are received by
the user because it checks the lowest SINR range. When all c1s are success-
fully received, S1(t) = W . If S1(t)  WT , we proceed to check S2(t). We re-
peat until we reach Si(t) < WT . That is, we pick i = min j; s.t.Sj(t) < WT .
The base station then estimates the channel condition Ec(t) = Ei. For this
threshold-based comparison, it is important to choose a proper threshold T .
We analyze the impact of T on performance of our algorithm in Section 2.4.1.
2.3.3 Implementation of Multiple Challenges
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, we need a way to construct multiple challenges
having dierent success probability curves using the limited number of given
modulation and coding options. In this section, we introduce two methods
to reshape the success probability of a challenge.
The rst method is processing gain [23] which improves SINR by trans-
mitting the same signal multiple times; when these copies add up, the signal
energy increases by more than the noise power, thus increasing the SINR
and shifting the success probability curve higher. To explain the concept of
processing gain more formally, we rely on communication theory. We assume
that a signal s(t) is transmitted through an additive white Gaussian noise
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(AWGN) channel n(t). The AWGN channel is a channel model which dis-
tribution is normal distribution. We assume that in our channel, mean is
zero and variance is 2 ( N(0; 2)). The variance is considered to be noise
power. SINR is calculated in symbol time (T ) basis. When two identical
signals are transmitted, the signal energy is
R T
0
j2s(t)j2 dt = 4 R T
0
js(t)j2 dt.
Hence, the energy of two signals is four times (6dB) higher than that of a
single signal. The addition of two AWGN sources is considered to be the
sum of two normal distributions (N(0; 2) + N(0; 2) = N(0; 22)). Hence,
the noise power (22) of two signals is two times (3dB) higher than that (2)
of a single signal. Consequently, the ratio of signal energy to noise power of
the sum of two signals is two. With the addition of two signals, we can shift
a success probability curve of a challenge to left by 3dB. With the larger
number of signal additions, we can shift the success probability curve further
to left.
The second method is to add noise in a signal at the transmitter. By
adding a noise to a signal, we can reduce the ratio of signal energy to noise
power of a signal. Hence, we can shift a success probability curve a challenge
to right.
2.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance and the security of our algorithm.
First, we analyze the impact of algorithm parameters on the performance of
our algorithm. This analysis can be used to guide our parameter choices.
We then perform simulations and compare the result of our analysis to those
of our simulation. Second, we integrate our algorithm into a network sim-
ulator and evaluate the eect of our algorithm on system performance. We
show that our algorithm securely and eectively estimates channel condition
through most of its parameter space. Third, we analyze the security of our
algorithm. In this analysis, we show that an attacker cannot, by guessing the
value of a challenge, cause the channel condition estimate to be higher than
if the attacker decoded the challenge in the same way as a normal user. In
other words, regardless of the length of a challenge value, an attacker and a
normal user that experience equivalent channel conditions will receive equal
channel estimates in expectation.
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2.4.1 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the eect of parameter choices on our channel
condition estimation algorithm. Specically, we derive average estimation
error E[jCQI   dCQIj] based on algorithm parameters such as window size
(W ), threshold (T ), the size of a challenge and Psref(i) of a challenge. CQI
in the average estimation error equation represents an actual CQI-level. dCQI
represents an estimated CQI-level.
Assumptions. Our analysis assumes that the channel condition does not
change. To analyze variable channel condition, we need to enumerate all
possible cases for channel conditions in multiple slots. This analysis requires
excessive amounts of computing power. Hence, we use simulation to consider
the eect of variable channel condition in Section 2.4.2. The equations in our
analysis do not assume the same values of challenge size and Psref(i) for each
challenge. However, allowing dierent values of challenge size and Psref(i)
increases the parameter space substantially. So when we plot gures, we use
the same challenge size and Psref(i) for all challenges.
Analysis. Given a target SINR which is mapped to a CQI, we calculate
the probability distribution on the estimated CQI (dCQI), and then we calcu-
late average estimation error. We start by assuming that we have functions
Ri(SINR; Psref(i));8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Lg representing the probability that a bit
of a challenge ci is successfully received given an SINR. This function depends
on the modulation and coding method used for constructing challenges, and
is well-understood in communication theory [24]; we later illustrate numer-
ical results with a specic modulation and coding scheme. The probability
Pcsi that a challenge ci is successfully received is calculated as
Pcsi = Ri(SINR; Psref(i))
SCi
where SCi is the length in bits of challenge ci. The number of successful
challenges in a window of size W for challenge ci is binomially distributed
with probability Pcsi . Hence, the probability Pci(n) of exactly n successful
challenges can be expressed as
Pci(n) =

W
n

P ncsi (1  Pcsi)W n
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We can now calculate the probability Pec(i; SINR) that CQI is estimated to be
i given SINR. dCQI = i represents that Ei+1 is chosen by our algorithm. (The
lowest CQI is 0 as in our previous case study.) Our algorithm estimates CQI
by comparing the number of successful challenge receptions to the product of
window size and thresholdWT . Counting the number of successful challenge
receptions from the lowest CQI-level, our algorithm determines dCQI = i when
the number of successful challenge receptions for CQI-level i is less thanWT .
For CQI-level less than i, the number of successful challenge receptions is
greater than or equal to WT . Hence, Pec(i; SINR);8i 2 f0; : : : ; L   1g is
calculated as
Pec(i; SINR) =
iQ
j=1
 
Pcj(dWT e) + Pcj(dWT e+ 1)   + Pcj(W )

  1   Pci+1(dWT e) + Pci+1(dWT e+ 1) +   + Pci+1(W )
For CQI-level L, we have a dierent form.
Pec(L; SINR) =
LY
j=1
 
Pcj(dWT e) + Pcj(dWT e+ 1) +   + Pcj(W )

With Pec(i; SINR), we can obtain the average estimation error as follows.
E[jCQI  dCQIj] = LX
i=0
jCQI  ijPec(i; SINR)
Using this analysis on average estimation error, we now want to properly
set window size, threshold, the size of a challenge, and reference probability
Psref(i) of a challenge so that the average estimation error is minimized. As
discussed in our assumptions, we use the same values of challenge size and
Psref(i) for dierent challenges for ease of performance comparison. To obtain
specic numerical results, we use the same CQI conguration as the UMTS
system, which is explained in our case study about cooperative relaying pro-
tocol in Section 2.2.3. Since Pec has a non-continuous function (ceil function),
it is dicult to apply optimization theory. To search for optimal parameters
in the discontinuous space, we used a hill-climbing approach [25]. First, we
set initial values for each parameter intuitively. We then iteratively picked
a parameter, optimized this parameter leaving all other parameters xed,
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Figure 2.5: Analysis on average estimation error.
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and repeated this process until we converged on a locally optimal parameter
set. In the following results, we started with this parameter set and varied
parameters one at a time to explore the impact of each parameter on system
performance. Our calculation uses the reception probability for QPSK as
Ri(SINR; Psref(i)). We choose target SINR to allow for equal amounts of
overestimation and underestimation in terms of CQI-level; in UMTS, this
corresponds to a CQI level of 15 and an SINR of -1.19dB.
Figure 2.5 shows our calculated average estimation error. The results show
an optimal point for each parameter, the size of a challenge, reference prob-
ability of a challenge, and threshold. To analyze the optimal points in more
detail, we plot the probability of accurate estimation in Figure 2.6. In Fig-
ure 2.7, we show the probability that the number of successful challenge
transmissions is greater than WT for each challenge to demonstrate why the
optimal points exist. As the size of a challenge increases, the probability
curve slides in the direction of underestimation. Increasing the threshold
moves the probability curve in the same direction as the size of a challenge.
With increasing reference probability, the probability curve moves towards
the direction of overestimation. For window size, larger window size pro-
vides a better accuracy. This is intuitively obvious, since the large window
size provides larger number of test samples for estimating channel condition.
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2.4.2 Simulation
We performed a simulation study to verify our analysis and consider the eect
of variable channel condition eect on the performance of our algorithm. We
start with the case of a static channel condition.
Static Channel Condition. We implemented our algorithm in the ns-2
simulator. We use simulations with static channel condition to ensure that
our analysis and implementation are valid. We use the same mapping from
channel condition to CQI as we did in Section 2.2.2. As in the numerical
results of our analysis, we consider the verication process for an SINR of
-1.19dB which is a CQI of 15, and modulation using QPSK. We use the same
optimal parameter selection as we used in the analysis in Section 2.4.1. We
use the default UMTS time slot duration of 2ms, and our algorithm estimates
the channel condition in each time slot. We vary window size and threshold,
xing Psref(i) and the length of each challenge value. We perform ve runs
for each value of window size and threshold.
For each estimation, we record the dierence between actual CQI and
estimated CQI (in absolute value). Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 show the av-
erage value of the dierences, and validate the results of our analysis. As
window size increases, the average estimation error decreases as expected.
For all values of window size, the estimation error is below 1 CQI-level, and
decreases to 0.05 CQI-levels as the window size grows to 100. Even larger
windows would further reduce the error. However, our results show that our
algorithm performs accurately with a reasonable window size.
Variable Channel Condition. Even though we can adjust parameters
to optimize estimation accuracy in environments with static channel con-
dition, the same parameter setting does not guarantee the same accuracy
under a variable channel condition. We use a variable condition channel
model to evaluate the eectiveness of our algorithm under a variable channel
condition. We repeat the previous simulations, replacing the static channel
condition with three UMTS channel models [26]: Indoor A with velocity
3km/h, Pedestrian A with velocity 15km/h and Vehicular A with velocity
120km/h. Figure 2.8 shows the eect of window size on average estimation
error. The average estimation error in variable channel conditions is greater
than the error in a static channel condition, and the window size has sig-
nicantly less impact on accuracy than in a static channel condition; this
25
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Figure 2.8: Varying window size.
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Figure 2.9: Varying threshold.
shows that the variability of the channel condition prevents our algorithm
from achieving arbitrary precision by indenitely increasing the window size.
Nonetheless, in most cases, our algorithm's error is not greater than 1 CQI-
level. Furthermore, both legitimate nodes and attacking nodes experience
similar errors, further reducing the eectiveness of overclaiming. Figure 2.9
shows the average estimation error for various values of threshold. Again,
the estimation error in a static channel condition is less than the errors in
variable channel conditions. However, our result shows that we can nd a
value of threshold that limits the estimation error less than 1.5 CQI-levels,
and that the optimal parameters for static channel condition continues to be
eective under variable channel conditions.
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Figure 2.10: The eect of our Algorithm on a relaying network example
(one relayer).
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Figure 2.11: The eect of our algorithm on a relaying network example
(two relayers).
2.4.3 System Performance
So far, we have evaluated the performance and the security of our secure
channel estimation algorithm. Now, we evaluate the impact of our secure
channel condition estimation algorithm on system performance. This eval-
uation provides an understanding on how much the estimation error of our
algorithm aects the system performance. Our reference system is the sys-
tem that we used for the previous case studies on cooperative relaying system
and opportunistic scheduler system in Section 2.2.2. We do not evaluate the
system performance for ecient routing metric in wireless ad hoc networks
because our channel estimation is single hop, while multi-hop routing requires
secure multi-hop channel estimation; we leave this problem to future work.
Cooperative Relaying Network. Our basic simulation setting is the same
as our case study for a cooperative relaying network. In our simulated net-
work, the base station is the trac source. The victim node chooses a relayer
node if the relayer has a better channel condition. An attacking relayer node
overclaims its channel condition to intercept packets to the victim node.
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Figure 2.12: The eect of our algorithm on opportunistic scheduler.
As shown in Section 2.4.2, the channel model can aect the estimation er-
ror of our algorithm. Hence, we use the three channel models (Indoor A,
Pedestrian A, and Vehicular A) that we used for the simulation of variable
channel condition. These results will show us how the estimation error due
to varying channel condition aects the system performance. As we vary
the distance between the base station and the victim node, we measure the
victim's throughput under the false channel condition reporting attack.
Figure 2.10 shows the measured results when the network consists of one
relayer and the victim node, that is, the attacker node is the only possible
relayer for the victim node. We consider three dierent cases: overclaiming by
1 CQI-level, overclaiming by 10 CQI-levels, and defense with our algorithm.
In the rst two cases, we do not use our defense algorithm, and compare
them to the third case. When the victim node is close to the base station,
our defense mechanism provides substantial gains. When the victim node is
far from the base station, it has low capacity even without a malicious relayer.
Hence, the results of all three cases come close to each other. Figure 2.11
shows the results of an environment where there are two relayers, one of
which is an attacker. In this environment, the redundant relayer reduces the
eect of the attacker. In both environments, our results are consistent across
all three channel models, even though our algorithm's performance diers
substantially from model to model as shown in Section 2.4.2. This result
shows that the estimation error of our algorithm is small enough that it has
minimal impact on system performance in all three channel models.
Opportunistic Scheduler. We also implemented our algorithm in the
simulation environment that we used for the case study of the opportunistic
scheduler. All parameters of our simulation here are the same as those we
used in our previous case study on opportunistic scheduling, except that we
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use the three channel models from the previous simulation. We measure the
throughput of normal users under scheduling policies of PF and MAX-SINR
with and without our algorithm. In MAX-SINR with our algorithm, a base
station does not use user-reported CQI-level to pick which user has the best
channel condition in a given time slot. Instead, the base station uses the
CQI-level estimated by our algorithm. In the case study of the opportunistic
scheduler, our observation was that PF scheduler prevented attackers from
stealing throughput. Hence, we concluded that the PF was a good candidate
for defending against the false channel condition reporting attack. How-
ever, our simulation results for the system performance in Figure 2.12 show
that MAX-SINR with our algorithm can achieve higher throughput than PF
scheduler in most cases. Occasionally PF outperforms MAX-SINR, because
our algorithm occasionally overestimates the receiver's channel condition, in
which case the base station may choose a modulation scheme that is too
aggressive, resulting in packet loss.
2.4.4 Security Analysis
The security of our scheme for securely estimating channel condition relies
on the assumption that the attacker cannot predict the challenge values gen-
erated by a pseudo-random number generator. An attacker, then, has two
strategies by which he can generate replies: either the attacker can guess
the challenge value, or the attacker can attempt to decode the received chal-
lenge value as a normal user would. In this section, we will show that when
the challenge values are chosen using a pseudo-random number generator,
decoding is the dominating strategy of an attacker.
We assume that a data symbol experiences an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel, which is a typical model. The optimal (maximum-
likelihood) decoder under AWGN takes the input signal and provides the data
symbol most likely to correspond to that signal. An attacker that guesses
ignores the input signal entirely, and as such, throws away any information
contained in the input signal. Discarding this information could not improve
the attacker's expected performance, because otherwise the optimal decoder
would not be optimal. In other words, the attacker gains no advantage by
guessing instead of decoding.
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To illustrate, we consider BPSK coding with a received power level of 1
and AWGN power . In this environment, the sender sends +1 to send a
1-bit and -1 to send a 0-bit. The receiver receives the sender's value plus
a random value drawn from N(0; 2). The optimal decoder decodes a 1-
bit if the received value is greater than 0 and a 0-bit otherwise, which has
probability of success Q(  1

). Since  > 0, Q(  1

) > 0:5. By simply guessing
a bit, an attacker is successful with probability 0.5. The success probability
of decoding is always greater than or equal to the success probability of
guessing. Hence, if the challenge values are randomly generated, the optimal
strategy is to use the optimal decoder. This result shows that an attacker
cannot outperform a normal user.
2.5 Related Work
Attacks on Hybrid Networks. A hybrid network is one that imple-
ments cooperative relaying using two distinct data link technologies. Car-
bunar et al. [14] propose JANUS for defending against selsh or malicious
behavior in establishing routes in hybrid networks. They consider the possi-
bility of a rate ination attack in which a node reports a higher bandwidth
to base station than the node can provide. However, their attack overclaims
the output rate of a link rather than the channel quality. In JANUS a base
station sends request packets to nodes, and uses the fact that an overclaimed
link will experience congestive losses. However, JANUS' request packets are
not cryptographically secured, so the attacker can guess when it needs to send
a response packet to hide the attack from the base station. Our approach
diers from the JANUS' in that our algorithm uses cryptographic security to
protect challenge messages. More fundamentally, because our verication is
conducted at the physical layer, it allows for a more ne-grained verication
of channel condition. Haas et al. [15] propose SUCAN, which defends against
Byzantine behaviors in hybrid networks. However, they do not consider at-
tacks that misreport channel condition.
Attacks on Routing Protocols in Ad-hoc Networks. In wireless ad-
hoc network routing protocols, an attacker can inject forged routing packets
into a network to disrupt routing. Many researchers have studied defense
mechanisms against such attacks [27]. However, there is no study on false
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channel condition reporting attack against ecient routing metrics.
Attacks on Opportunistic Schedulers. Bali et al. [28] reveal a vul-
nerability in the PF scheduler that can be induced by a malicious trac
pattern. Bursty trac enables a single ow to occupy several consecutive
slots. They measure this attack's eect on real EV-DO network. The work
by Racic et al. [13] on PF scheduler is the closest work to ours in the sense
that they consider the eect of falsely reporting channel condition. They
conclude that falsely reporting channel condition alone does not harm other
users very much in networks using a PF scheduler. They do nd that falsely
reporting combined with handover can occupy many consecutive time slots,
thereby stealing other user's opportunity to be served. Unlike this work,
we nd cases where false reporting channel condition alone can signicantly
aect other user's performance in other network settings.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, I have studied the threat posed by attacks that falsely report
their channel condition. Through case studies for three dierent types of
wireless network protocols, we show that in a cooperative relaying network
and a network using ETX, a false reporting attack can signicantly reduce
the performance of other users. Our false channel-feedback attack can arise
in any channel-aware protocol where a user reports its own channel condition.
To counter such attacks, we propose a secure channel condition estimation
algorithm to prevent the overclaiming attack. Through analysis and simula-
tions, we show that with proper parameters, we can prevent the overclaiming
attack.
The protocol I describe requires that a trusted entity send each challenge
message, and we present two case studies, the opportunistic scheduler and
the single-hop cooperative relaying, in which the trusted entity naturally
arises within the environment. In a multi-hop channel-aware protocol, an
intermediate hop may have no incentive to correctly estimate channel condi-
tion or to correctly relay another link's estimated channel condition. In this
chapter, I have focused on the single-hop channel estimation environment,
and I leave secure multi-hop estimation and reporting to future work.
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CHAPTER 3
CRAFT: A DOS DEFENSE
ARCHITECTURE AGAINST COLLUDING
ATTACKS
In this chapter, I consider the management of network link bandwidth re-
sources. A network bandwidth management module determines fairly the
allowable trac rate of users. A representative example of an attack against
network bandwidth is link-ooding attack. I consider a strong adversary:
a colluding receiver. This strong attack model requires a defense mech-
anism to be deployed in every router in a network. I present a defense
architecture to defend against colluding attacker scenario with minimal re-
quirement of deployment size. This work is the result of a collaboration with
Dr. Jerry T. Chiang, Prof. Yih-Chun Hu, Prof. Adrian Perrig and Prof.
P. R. Kumar.
3.1 Introduction
Various defense mechanisms against link-ooding DoS (denial of service) at-
tack have been proposed [29{38]. There are two main approaches in the
published literature that defends against link-ooding attacks: ltering ap-
proaches and capability approaches. Filtering approaches detect malicious
trac and cooperate with upstream routers to block them at (or close to)
the origin [37, 38]. Capability approaches provide cryptographically strong
tokens to each ow to ensure that each ow gets a rate acceptable to both
the destination and the deploying routers [29,31,34].
Although the previous work improves DoS-resistance in a variety of attack
scenarios, they do not minimize the required deployment while providing
strong deployment incentives. For example, in the recent work NetFence [34],
a router experiencing a congestion securely noties an upstream access router
of the congestion, causing the access router to rate-limit trac towards the
downstream bottleneck link. NetFence claims incrementally deployability
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since the Internet core is over-provisioned. However, in order to protect
against DoS trac from a particular source, either NetFence, or the Pass-
port [39] on which it is built, needs to be deployed at that specic source.
In other words, the deployment requirement of NetFence is similar to that
of ingress ltering in that it imposes a cost on an AS in order to benet
non-customers.
In this chapter, I present CRAFT (Capability-based Regulation of All
Flows and Trac), a DoS defense architecture that has minimal deployment
requirement to defend against compromised and possibly colluding sender
and receiver hosts.
Our basic approach is to securely enforce that all ows follow a specied
end-to-end congestion control algorithm. CRAFT enables a deploying router
to identify misbehaving ows and drop their packets so that each traversing
ow competes fairly with other ows in any link downstream of that router.
In other words, to defend against collusion DoS attacks, only the access
routers need to deploy CRAFT in order to protect the entire network.
Why enforce end-to-end congestion control? Our insight into end-
to-end congestion control (e.g. TCP) is that each benign end host already
implicitly detects congestion in network and properly reduces trac rate
without knowing the network internals. This principle enables us to minimize
the necessary deployment of a network protocol: by securely enforcing end-
to-end congestion control algorithm at access routers, we can defend against
compromised and possibly colluding end hosts.
As a reference design, CRAFT enforces TCP operations by emulating the
TCP state machine of each ow at each access router. This scheme im-
poses a memory overhead at each access router. Our design strives to reduce
this overhead by keeping memory overhead independent from the number of
outstanding packets. Moreover, the overhead only burdens deploying access
routers and not any non-deploying core routers. We implement a prototype
to evaluate the plausibility of our design.
I will restrict the discussion of CRAFT to enforcing TCP hereafter. Since
CRAFT enforces TCP congestion control, CRAFT guarantees per-ow fair-
ness specied by TCP. A particular issue thus arises: given per-ow fairness,
an attacker can seek to deny service by initiating an excessive number of
ows. We discuss this issue in Section 3.6.3.
Our contributions in this work are:
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 We show that our approach is implementable. Specically, we design
a mechanism that enforces TCP, the most widely deployed congestion
control algorithm in the Internet.
 We design CRAFT to mitigate DoS attacks while remaining ecient in
terms of router and end-host computation and storage.
 We implement CRAFT to show that our design is practical and deploy-
able.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briey explains
TCP congestion control, which will be enforced by CRAFT. Section 3.3 in-
troduces our design goals and system assumptions. I then present strawman
design and the basic design of CRAFT in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. I
discuss potential attacks against the basic design and suggest defense mecha-
nisms in Section 3.6. I present an evaluation of CRAFT in terms of overhead
and security in Section 3.7. After some discussions in Section 3.8, Section 3.9
summarizes this chapter.
3.2 Background on TCP
In this section, I introduce some concepts and acronyms related to TCP. The
purpose of this section is not to explain all details on TCP but to briey in-
troduce main concepts of TCP. The one who wants more details on TCP can
refer to some literatures [1,40]. My explained TCP is based on standard [1].
In TCP, each byte is given a contiguous sequence number for each direction
of a TCP connection. Each packet contains the sequence number of the rst
byte contained in that packet, as well as an acknowledgment number, which
represents the sequence number of the last contiguously received byte for the
opposite-direction trac.
TCP congestion control treats the network as a black box, observing the
end-to-end delay and loss characteristics and choosing a data sending rate
compatible with all intermediate links. The main goal of the TCP conges-
tion control is to estimate the available network bandwidth and adjust the
oered load accordingly. A TCP sender adjusts its oered load by chang-
ing its congestion window (cwnd), which represents the maximum number
of unacknowledged data bytes that the sender releases into the network at a
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time.
When an acknowledgment packet arrives at a sender, the sender increases
its cwnd. There are two modes to increase cwnd: slow start and congestion
avoidance. In slow start phase, a TCP sender increases cwnd rapidly since it
assumes that a network is much under-utilized. When cwnd reaches a thresh-
old (ssthresh), it enters congestion avoidance phase. In congestion avoidance
phase, a TCP sender assumes that the network is closing to congestion point.
Hence, the sender increases cwnd more slowly than slow start phase.
With increased cwnd, a packet will be lost in a congested link in the net-
work. TCP recognizes the congestion through packet loss. When a packet is
lost, the receiver reacts to an unacknowledged out-of-order packet (that is,
one with sequence number greater than the next contiguous sequence num-
ber) by sending an acknowledgment which has the same acknowledgment
number as the previous acknowledgment packet, known as a duplicate ac-
knowledgment. When the sender receives a third duplicate acknowledgment,
it considers the following packet to have been lost, and transmits that packet
in a process known as fast retransmit. Once this packet is acknowledged, the
sender performs fast recovery by halving the size of its cwnd, and setting the
ssthresh to the new cwnd, thus entering congestion avoidance. When the
large number of packets are lost, a sender may not receive duplicate acks. In
that case, the sender expires a timer and starts slow start phase.
3.3 Problem Statement
3.3.1 Goal and Basic Approach
Our basic goal is to propose a secure fair protocol that provides network-
wide protection: as soon as a ow registered for our system traverses a single
deploying router, it competes fairly on all downstream links with both other
legitimate trac and legacy Internet trac. We achieve this network-wide
protection property by emulating the state machine of each ow and en-
forcing each ow to follow an end-to-end congestion control algorithm. One
might think that emulating the state of each ow is too expensive. We will
consider this overhead in our design. In addition, we think that it is worth to
investigate this preventive approach to provide benets to system operators
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in a funding-constrained network so that they do not need to deploy a secu-
rity mechanism for every link. To make our discussion concrete, we attempt
to emulate TCP state machine.
3.3.2 Design Consideration
To eciently and practically emulate TCP state machine, we address the
following design considerations; we explain later how we deal with each con-
sideration.
 Fairness: There can be various denitions of fairness. In this work, we
dene a fair rate as the rate that a legitimate TCP ow gets.
 Minimal trust: We assume that CRAFT router does not trust any
information received by other entities to provide the strong security.
(Section 3.4)
 Asymmetric route: Generally, the Internet paths for a given ow are
not symmetry [41]. Hence, we assume that even though a forward packet
go through a CRAFT router, the corresponding backward packet may
not go through the CRAFT router. (Section 3.4)
 Minimal per-ow state at routers: Since a router only has lim-
ited amount of memory, a router must minimize the amount of per-ow
state stored in memory in order to serve the maximum number of ows.
Our protocol uses pre-capability to lessen the per-ow state stored at a
deploying router. (Section 3.5.2)
 Packet reordering or loss: In the Internet, packets can be reordered
or lost. Identifying packet reordering or loss is important for emulating
TCP state since packet loss aects the rate of a TCP ow. (Section 3.5.3)
 Other transport layer protocols: We use TCP fairness as our def-
inition for fair congestion control. Applications use UDP for various
purposes including to avoid retransmission, to avoid rate control in the
event of loss and to reduce the transport-layer overhead on each packet.
Nonetheless, in a network that provides secure congestion control, this
ows also need to be subject to congestion control. Therefore, in our
design, non-TCP ows are rate-limited to the TCP-fair rate.
 Various avor of TCP: There are two ways to handle various avor
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of TCP. One way is to try to emulate all kinds of TCP and specify
the avor of TCP of each ow in packet header. The other way is to
emulate the most aggressive TCP which is acceptable in standard. In
this chapter, I explain how to implement the second way (Section 3.5.4).
Our techniques presented in this chapter can easily extend to the rst
way. The issue to support various avor of TCP is further discussed in
Section 3.8.1.
3.3.3 Threat Model
We design our protocol to treat the above design considerations under a
strong attacker model. We make no assumptions about the behavior of com-
promised end hosts; in particular, we do not prevent compromised end hosts
from colluding and we allow a compromised end host to send packets at any
arbitrary rate.
We do not consider a compromised router to arbitrarily drop packets that
traverses through that router. Defense against such attack is orthogonal of
our work. We assume that a compromised router does not pass the informa-
tion generated by a CRAFT router to a colluding source host.
3.4 Strawman Design
For easy presentation of CRAFT, I here present a `strawman' design to se-
curely emulate TCP state of a ow before we present CRAFT. Flow is dened
by source IP, destination IP, source port, and destination port. Our straw-
man design is an expensive way to emulate TCP algorithm [1] in an ideal
case where no packet malfunction (reordering or loss) happens. I later ex-
plain how CRAFT solves these limitations. Detailed explanation of TCP is
beyond the scope of this chapter. The one who are not familiar with the
terminologies and the acronyms that we will use in this chapter can refer to
Section 3.2 or some literatures [1, 40].
In TCP, the rate of a ow is allowed to increase only on successful re-
ception of an acknowledgment packet. TCP assumes that a sender and a
receiver operates in a specied way. However, in an adversarial environment,
a sender can arbitrarily increase its rate without reception of an acknowl-
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Figure 3.1: Strawman design: a strawman router generates a random value
(Ri) corresponding to a packet ID (i) and stores the random value. After
the receiver gets the random value, the receiver forwards the random value
to the sender. The sender includes the received random value to strawman
router in a future packet. By comparing the received random value to the
store random value, the strawman router can ensure that the previous
forward and backward packet were successfully received by the receiver and
sender, respectively.
edgment. In addition, a receiver can send acknowledgments without actually
receiving a packet [42] since acknowledgments in TCP are not cryptograph-
ically dependent on the data in the TCP packet. I show how our strawman
design prevents a TCP ow from misbehaving. For simplicity, I present our
proposed protocol as it would operate when data ows in only one direction,
even though our protocol design, simulation, and implementation extend to
bidirectional ows.
Intuition. The main goal of this strawman version is to ensure that a for-
ward packet is indeed received by a receiver and the corresponding backward
packet is received by a sender. Figure 3.1 shows that a strawman router
uses a self-generated random value to check the receptions of a sender and a
receiver. The random value is transferred to a receiver and the receiver sub-
sequently transfers the random value to a sender. The sender includes the
received random value in the following packets. When the strawman router
receives the valid random value, it can ensure that corresponding forward
and backward packets are actually received by the receiver and the sender
respectively. This architecture addresses minimal trust and asymmetry of
Internet path discussed in Section 3.3.2. Our trust model is that a strawman
router trusts only itself. For asymmetry of Internet path, this strawman
version does not require the backward packet to traverse the same strawman
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Algorithm 1 Strawman version
Packet header from sender: <Packet ID (pid), Random value ID (rid),
Random value (Rrid)>
On strawman router's receiving a packet
r  withdraw random value(rid)
if r == Rrid then
calculate new window size()
Rpid  generate new random value(pid)
store random value(pid,Rpid)
insert random value to packet(Rpid)
else
drop packet
end if
Packet header from router: <Packet ID (pid), Random value (Rpid)>
On receiver's sending a packet
insert random value to packet(Rpid)
On sender's sending a packet
insert random value to packet(Rpid)
insert new packet ID to packet(pid+ 1)
router that the forward packet traversed. CRAFT preserves these properties.
Algorithm 1 shows the strawman version packet header and the whole
procedure of a strawman router, sender and receiver. We assume that ow
ID for a packet is identied before this algorithm is performed. When a
sender wants to send a new packet, it allocates unique packet ID to each
packet. The sender inserts the packet ID, the latest received random value
and the corresponding random value ID. The random value ID is the packet
ID of a packet for that a strawman router previously generates a random
value. When a packet arrives at a strawman router, the router attempt
to check if the received random value is valid. If the value is valid, the
router calculates new window size for the corresponding ow. We explain
this function (calculate new window size()) in more detail in Section 3.5.4.
Afterwards, the router generates a new random value for the new received
packet. This new random value and packet ID are inserted to the packet and
delivered to receiver and sender. If the received random value is not valid,
a router punishes the corresponding ow by dropping the packet or deleting
the ow state. The function of receiver is just to forward the received packet
ID and random number to the sender. When the sender sends a new packet,
it increases its packet ID by 1 and repeats the same procedure.
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Even though we set aside the limitation of this version for handling packet
reordering or loss, this strawman version has two problems: large memory
space in router and no handling of delayed ack. As the window size of a TCP
ow increases, the number of packets outstanding in a network increases.
Consequently, the number of random values that a strawman router need
to keep can be too large. Delayed ack is an acknowledgment packet for two
received forward packet. Delayed ack is used to reduce the packet overhead
in network. Since strawman version header can include only one random
value, strawman version does not handle delayed ack. A simple method
to handle delayed ack is to include multiple random values in a strawman
version header. However, this method costs the space of packet header. We
introduce the concepts of pre-capability and capability to handle these issues
in next section.
3.5 CRAFT Design
In this section, I present how CRAFT solves the limitations of our strawman
design to eciently emulate TCP states in the real Internet environment.
Our specic target version of TCP is based on a standard documentation [1].
I understand that there are many variants of the standard TCP. However,
the purpose of this work is not to handle all variants but to provide primary
techniques to eciently handle reordering and loss. Usually, dierent TCP
versions use dierent management of congestion window responding to loss.
Hence, I believe that securing other versions of TCP is not dicult since it
is simply a task to adapt congestion window properly with our techniques.
It is also important to note that CRAFT decides the upper bound of a ow
based on the standard. I start by introducing the overview of CRAFT before
presenting details.
3.5.1 Overview
CRAFT operates similarly to our strawman design as shown in Figure 3.2.
The main dierence is that CRAFT uses pre-capability and capability instead
of a random value. Pre-capability and capability are designed to deal with
reordering and loss in a memory space-ecient way. I explain the detailed
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Figure 3.2: Capability-based enforcement of TCP congestion control
algorithm. A CRAFT router generates a pre-capability (Pf;i) for a packet
(i) of a ow (f). After the receiver gets the pre-capability, the receiver
calculates and forwards a new capability (Cf;i) to the sender. The sender
includes received capability to the CRAFT router in a future packet.
construction of pre-capability and capability in Section 3.5.2.
When a sender initiates a CRAFT ow, it sends a CRAFT request packet,
and the router allocates state in its memory corresponding to the new ow.
When the ow initiation packet reaches the receiver, the receiver allocates
state for the new ow, and sends an acknowledgment to the sender to nish
connection establishment. This bootstrapping procedure can be implemented
in TCP SYN and SYN-ACK packets.
Algorithm 2 shows the packet header of CRAFT packets and the whole
procedure of CRAFT after a connection establishment. I explain each eld
in the packet header when I explain corresponding operations. Once a sender
establishes a connection, the sender allocates a unique contiguous number,
the Packet ID, for each packet it wishes to send. The CRAFT Packet ID will
be dierent from and is somewhat uncorrelated to a TCP sequence number
since the TCP sequence number is issued based on the byte number, while
CRAFT Packet ID is issued based on the packet number. A CRAFT router
unconditionally generates a pre-capability for the rst packet of a new ow
since a default congestion window is equal to or larger than one. This pre-
capability is transferred to a receiver. The receiver calculates a capability
corresponding to the received pre-capability (Section 3.5.2) and transfers the
capability to the sender in an acknowledgment. To prove to the CRAFT
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router that the sender has indeed received an acknowledgment, the sender
includes the most recent capability it has received from the receiver in its
new packet to send. The router rst checks to see if this router has previously
seen this packet ID for this ow, for example by using a data structure similar
to the one IPSec uses for duplicate detection [43]. If the Packet ID is a dupli-
cate, the packet is discarded; otherwise the router calculates a corresponding
capability for this packet as described in Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.5.3. If
the calculated capability does not match the received capability, the packet is
dropped. Otherwise, the router updates cwnd as described in Section 3.5.4.
The CRAFT router then determines whether or not this packet can be sent
using the current cwnd; if not, it drops the packet. Otherwise, it replaces the
valid capability (which is now no longer needed) with a new pre-capability
specic to the Packet ID of this packet and forwards the packet to the next
hop. Afterwards, the same procedures are repeated.
3.5.2 Pre-capability and Capability
In this section, we present the construction of pre-capability and capability.
We show how pre-capability and capability deal with memory space overhead
while preserving the security of CRAFT. For easy presentation, our illus-
trated example in this section is for the case that no reordering or loss hap-
pens. For the case of reordering or loss, the denitions of pre-capability and
capability remain the same, but the way of verifying capability is changed.
We explain how to handle reordering and loss in Section 3.5.3
Intuition. The inecient use of memory space and the diculty of handling
delayed ack in our strawman design result from the fact that a random value
is independent on a packet ID and one random value corresponds to only
one packet. To solve these issues, we introduce pre-capability that a CRAFT
router calculates from packet ID and capability that corresponds to all past
packets in an accumulative way. The fact that a CRAFT router calculates
pre-capability sounds insecure since the security of CRAFT comes from un-
predictability of a random value. CRAFT achieves unpredictability by using
computationally ecient keyed MAC (Message Authentication Code).
As shown in Figure 3.2, a CRAFT router generates a pre-capability (Pf;i)
when a new packet comes in. A pre-capability is generated by using a cryp-
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Algorithm 2 CRAFT
Packet header from sender: <Packet ID (pid), ACK ID (ackid), Capa-
bility (C), Timeout (TO), Reordered Packet IDs (rids), Lost Packet IDs
(lids)>
On CRAFT router's receiving a packet
if check duplicate packetID(pid) then
drop packet
end if
c calculate capability(ackid; rids; lids) (Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.5.3)
if c == C then
calculate new window size() (Section 3.5.4)
if is packet acceptable() then
P  calculate pre-capability(pid) (Section 3.5.2)
insert pre-capability to packet(P )
else
drop packet
end if
else
drop packet
end if
Packet header from router: <Packet ID (pid), ACK ID (ackid), Pre-
capability (P ), Reordered Packet IDs (rids), Lost Packet IDs (lids)>
On receiver's receiving a packet
C  calculate capability() (Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.5.3)
store capability(C)
Packet header from receiver: <Packet ID (pid), ACK ID (ackid),
Capability (C), Reordered Packet IDs (rids), Lost Packet IDs (lids)>
On receiver's sending a packet
insert capability to packet(C)
On sender's receiving a packet
store capability(C)
On sender's sending a packet
insert capability to packet(C)
insert new packet ID to packet(pid+ 1)
tographically secure hash function g:
Pf;i = g(K; f; i)
where K is the secret key of the CRAFT router, f is the ow ID, and i is the
Packet ID. Flow ID is a large value randomly generated by the router when
the ow is created. If g is a hash function in the Random Oracle Model [44],
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then Pf;i is indistinguishable from a random number because the pair (f; i)
has not been previously seen. Since K is known to only the CRAFT router,
it is computationally inecient to guess Pf;i. We further elaborate g function
with telescoping construction:
g(K; f; i) = EK(f jji) EK(f jji+ 1)
where EK represents a computationally ecient keyed MAC such as HMAC [45]
and jj is concatenation operator. By choosing EK as a secure pseudo-random
function, it follows that Pf;i is also indistinguishable from a random number.
This telescoping construction enables the CRAFT router to calculate a capa-
bility corresponding to a large set of contiguous pre-capabilities in constant
time.
When the receiver receives a packet (i) with a pre-capability (Pf;i), the re-
ceiver constructs a capability (Cf;i) associated with the packet. A capability
(Cf;i) is dened to be the exclusive-or of all received pre-capabilities up to i.
For the case of no reordering or loss,
Cf;i = Pf;0  : : : Pf;i
By using the exclusive-or function, we take advantage of a desirable property
where if any input (and its distribution) is unknown, the output is uniformly
distributed over the domain, yielding the largest uncertainty and secrecy in
the information theoretic sense. Moreover, since Pf;i = EK(f jji)EK(f jji+
1), the capability can be calculated eciently using
Cf;i = EK(f jj0) EK(f jji+ 1)
Hence, we need only a single xor operation to calculate a capability for a set
of contiguous pre-capabilities.
When the receiver sends an acknowledgment to the sender, the receiver
inserts the received packet ID i and corresponding capability Cf;i in the
acknowledgment. We call this packet ID ACK ID. ACK ID is dened to be
the largest contiguous packet ID that a receiver is acknowledging, subject
to the disclosed loss. A received Packet ID is contiguous as long as there
happens no reordering or loss. The term `disclosed loss' becomes clear when
we explain how to handle reordering and loss. When the sender sends a new
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Packet ID Random Value
Packet ID Random Value
For all outstanding packets
Lid Lrandom
(a) Strawman design
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ACK ID Capability
Lid Lrandom
(b) CRAFT
Figure 3.3: Comparison of router memory usage between strawman design
and CRAFT for a ow: Lid and Lrandom are reference length for comparison.
packet, the new packet ID will be i+1. At this time, the sender inserts ACK
ID i and capability Cf;i in the new packet. When the CRAFT router gets the
new packet from the sender, it can calculate capability Cf;i corresponding to
ACK ID i and ow ID f :
Cf;i = EK(f jj0) EK(f jji+ 1)
This operation requires only two hash operations and one xor operation. If a
CRAFT router stores Cf;i 1 and ACK ID i as shown in Figure 3.3(b), it need
only one hash operations and one xor operation at the expense of memory
space. These ACK ID and Capability are necessary for handling reordering
or loss. Hence, we keep these variables for memory comparison.
Now, we want to show that CRAFT deals with memory space overhead
and delayed ack. Figure 3.3 shows memory space required for managing ran-
dom values or capabilities in our strawman design and CRAFT. We exclude
variables related to TCP state since both designs have the same size of those
variables. While our strawman router keeps a ow state of packet IDs and
random values for all outstanding packets, a CRAFT router keeps the con-
stant size of a secret key, ack ID and capability for a ow. This property
results from the fact that a CRAFT router can calculate capability with
packet ID included in a packet. For handling delayed ack, it is important
to note that Cf;i proves that the receiver receives not only packet i but also
all packets up to i. Hence, to acknowledge two packets (Packet ID i and
i + 1), the receiver can only one capability Cf;i+1. This accumulative prop-
erty of capability enables CRAFT to use the minimal number of capabilities
to handle delayed ack.
45
3.5.3 Handling Reordering and Loss
Intuition. As long as no packets are reordered or lost, a CRAFT router can
easily verify a capability using Cf;i = EK(f jj0)EK(f jji+1) with ACK ID i.
When there happens reordering or loss between a sender and a receiver, the
receiver cannot know the pre-capability that it has not received. Hence, the
receiver cannot construct a capability in a contiguous way as the case of no
reordering or loss. Our basic idea to handle such a case is that the receiver
confesses the fact that it has not received some pre-capabilities by marking
non-received packet IDs in an acknowledgment packet. Then, the CRAFT
router excludes the confessed pre-capability to verify a received capability.
Related packet header. Related header elds (shown in Algorithm 2) for
handling reordering and loss are Reordered Packet IDs and Lost Packet IDs.
Reordered Packet IDs are a list of non-contiguous packet IDs that a receiver
receives. Lost Packet IDs are a list of lost packet IDs that a receiver has
not received. For example, we consider the case that a sender has received
acknowledgments for packets 0 through i, and packet i + 1 is lost. When a
receiver receives packet i+2, the receiver considers packet i+2 as a reordered
one and sends an immediate (not delayed) acknowledgment which reects an
ACK ID of i and a Reordered Packet IDs of i+ 2. The acknowledgment for
packet i+3 reects an ACK ID of i and a Reordered Packet IDs of fi+2; i+3g.
When packet i+ 4 arrives at the receiver, the receiver concludes that packet
ID i + 1 is lost [1] and send a third duplicate acknowledgment. This third
duplicate acknowledgment reects an ACK ID of i+4 and a Lost Packet IDs
of i+ 1.
When a receiver sends an acknowledgment, the receiver inserts a capabil-
ity as dened in Section 3.5.2. For the acknowledgment of ACK ID i and
Reordered Packet IDs fi+2; i+3g, the capability C is Cf;iPf;i+2Pf;i+3.
For the acknowledgment of ACK ID i + 4 and Lost Packet IDs i + 1, the
capability C is Cf;i  Pf;i+2  Pf;i+3  Pf;i+4.
After the sender receives the acknowledgment having the elds of Re-
ordered Packet IDs or Lost Packet IDs, the sender's new packet simply carries
these elds with received capability to the CRAFT router. If packets keep
being lost, the size of these elds gets larger. To avoid an excessively large
space in a packet, the CRAFT router stores an ACK ID having lost pack-
ets and the corresponding capability. When the receiver receives from the
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CRAFT router a packet having an ACK ID equal to or larger than the ACK
ID for which the receiver has disclosed lost packets, the receiver can safely
remove the corresponding lost packet IDs. For the previous example of lost
packet i+1, when the receiver gets a packet with ACK ID i+4, the receiver
does not need to contain lost packet i+ 1 in the eld of Lost Packet IDs. In
addition, there is a trick that reduces the size of the list of Lost Packet IDs.
When many contiguous packets are lost, a receiver can specify the interval
of lost packet IDs rather than individual lost packet IDs.
With Reordered Packet IDs and Lost Packet IDs that the receiver and the
sender confess, the CRAFT router can construct a proper capability in case
of reordering or loss. We now present the algorithm that CRAFT routers use
to verify capabilities. Our algorithm has constant per-ow storage overhead,
regardless of the number of losses experienced by each ow. For each ow,
the router keeps track of the largest ACK ID for which a capability was
correctly veried. Temporarily ignoring partial acknowledgments (out-of-
order acknowledgments with Packet ID greater than ACK ID), it also keeps
track of the most recent capability veried in this way. For example, if ACK
ID i were veried without losses, then the router would keep track of (i; Cf;i).
When a later packet with ACK ID i+ 4 and Lost Packet ID i+ 1 arrives,
the router checks to make sure that the presented capability C equals Cf;i
Pf;i+2  Pf;i+3  Pf;i+4; that is, the new capability is consistent with the
last valid capability exclusive-or the pre-capabilities between the last valid
capability and the current capability. More generally, if the router stores
ACK ID i and capability C, and the new packet indicates ACK ID j > i,
lost packets L = f`1; `2; : : : ; `ng, and capability C 0, then C 0 is valid if and
only if C 0 = C
L
fx2([i+1;j]nL)g Pf;x; that is, when we xor C with all pre-
capabilities between i + 1 and j that are not associated with a lost packet,
the result should be the new capability1. If C 0 is valid, we update the (ACK
ID, Capability) pair to (j; C 0).
When there are IDs in Reordered Packet IDs of a packet, we can remove
1Since x x = 0, we can eciently calculate
C
M
fx2([i+1;j]nL)g
Pf;x
= C  EK(f jji+ 1) EK(f jjj + 1)
M
x2([i+1;j]\L)
Pf;x
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them temporarily during the verication. In particular, if a packet has capa-
bility C and Reordered Packet IDs a1; a2, then, for purposes of verication, it
is the same as having capability CPf;a1 Pf;a2 and no partial acknowledg-
ments. We therefore adjust for partial acknowledgments before proceeding
with the verication steps discussed above. This also means that any stored
capabilities do not include partial acknowledgments, minimizing the neces-
sary router state.
3.5.4 Congestion Window Calculation
When a CRAFT router veries a new capability, it knows that one or more
additional packets have been acknowledged by the receiver, so the router up-
dates its emulated cwnd. Because the TCP protocol description leaves some
room for interpretation, a ow's exact cwnd depends on the TCP implemen-
tation. We thus only provide a reasonable bound on the cwnd according to
the standard [1].
Like a TCP sender, a CRAFT router maintains state on the cwnd, slow
start threshold (ssthresh), and maximum segment size of each ow. The
sender discloses the maximum segment size at connection initialization, and
whenever the maximum segment size changes. The CRAFT router updates
this state in a manner consistent with the behavior of a legitimate TCP
sender-receiver pair.
The CRAFT router can distinguish between acknowledgments generated
from contiguous packets and those generated due to out-of-order delivery by
examining the ACK ID and the partial acknowledgment elds. The cwnd
and ssthresh are initialized to some predened values suggested by the TCP
standard. In the case of contiguous packets, the CRAFT router emulates
a sender that has received one acknowledgment per packet, which is the
maximum that the TCP standard allows the receiver to send. Though a
unidirectional TCP ow uses delayed acknowledgments, i.e. sending only
one acknowledgment for every two received packets, a bidirectional TCP ow
opportunistically carries acknowledgments on new reverse trac, allowing the
possibility of one acknowledgment per packet. Since the cwnd grows faster
in this latter case, we choose to emulate the cwnd according to one ACK per
packet in order to form a reasonable upper bound of the cwnd.
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When a CRAFT router determines that acknowledgments are generated
due to out-of-order delivery, it does not adjust the cwnd until three such
duplicate acknowledgments are detected, at which point the sender must
include Lost Packet IDs in the CRAFT header. The CRAFT router then
emulates the TCP state associated with fast retransmission and fast recovery.
We have previously described how to detect fast retransmission. Because a
CRAFT router knows specically which packets were lost and which packets
were transmitted in response to that loss, it can easily emulate fast recovery.
Due to space constraints, we only describe simplied calculations.
In some circumstances, a TCP sender loses a packet and cannot recover
through the fast retransmission mechanism. In these cases, after a certain
period of time, the sender times out. To reect recovering from a timeout in
CRAFT, the timeout (TO) eld is set to 1. A router that sees a packet with
the timeout bit set to 1 then accepts any capability borne by this packet
(to reduce the burden of listing all lost packet IDs), resets the cwnd to one
packet, and halves the ssthresh.
3.5.5 Remaining Details
When CRAFT is deployed over multi-AS (Autonomous System) environ-
ment, a CRAFT router in an AS may not trust a CRAFT router in other
AS. In this case, CRAFT uses separate header elds for pre-capabilities and
capabilities of each CRAFT router. To accommodate multiple capabilities,
CRAFT can use short capability. We discuss the security issue for using
short capability in Section 3.6.1.
When one wants to deploy CRAFT with support for legacy trac, a
CRAFT router may allocate a certain amount of bandwidth to legacy traf-
c depending on its admission control policy, so that users who have not
deployed CRAFT can still have access to network service. Since users can
increase their trac rate arbitrarily, a CRAFT router limits the bandwidth
allocated to legacy trac by fair queuing.
If the route used by a CRAFT ow changes, any new CRAFT router on
the path will detect that this CRAFT ow is not associated with a previously
established connection. Any such router will ignore the CRAFT header in
the packet, treat the packet as legacy trac, and send a reset message to
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the corresponding sender of such ow. The sender can then reinitiate a new
CRAFT ow to the destination.
3.6 Potential Attacks and Defenses
In this section, I discuss several possible attacks against the basic design
of CRAFT as explained in Section 3.5 and describe our proposed defense
mechanisms.
3.6.1 Capability Forgery Attack
The size of capability aects the security and the overhead of a system. We
can use a short capability to reduce system overhead. In this case, an attacker
can attempt to guess a capability. If CRAFT uses 3-bit short capability, an
attacker can initiate a ow and ood the path with random capabilities,
1=(23) = 1=8 of which are expected to be accepted by the rst CRAFT
router on the path. If there are n deploying CRAFT router on the path
between the attacker and the bottleneck link, then 1=(23n) = 1=(8n) of the
packets are expected to enter the bottleneck link. Since deployed CRAFT
routers may be sparse in the initial phase of deployment, there may not be
enough CRAFT routers on the path to prevent the attacker from exhausting
the bottleneck link bandwidth.
Therefore, when a CRAFT router receives an excessive number of incor-
rect capabilities from a particular ow, it noties the sender to switch to
using long capabilities instead of the 3-bit short capabilities used under nor-
mal operations. We choose this approach rather than penalizing the ow to
prevent the attack where an attacker alters the capability of a packet from a
legitimate ow, thereby harming the performance of the benign ow.
When using long capabilities, such as those 32-bits long, the probability of
guessing a valid capability is vanishingly small, and an attacker that tries to
guess random capabilities will have its bandwidth reduced by a factor of 232
at each legitimate CRAFT router. To switch between short capability and
long capability, the CRAFT packet header needs to include a maker eld so
that a sender lets CRAFT router know which capability is used.
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Figure 3.4: Generation of a hash chain.
3.6.2 Packet ID Spoong Attack
As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, a CRAFT router removes duplicate packets
that share a Packet ID within a single ow. Thus, an attacker that forges a
packet with Packet ID p from a benign ow causes the actual benign packet
bearing Packet ID p to be dropped by the CRAFT router.
For this attack, we use a hash chain to authenticate the Packet ID. A hash
chain consists of a series of hash values generated by a cryptographic hash
function [46]. A cryptographic hash function takes a message of arbitrary
length as input, and computes a xed-length output, called a message digest.
Such function is preimage resistant if given h = H(m), it is infeasible to
obtain m.
To generate a hash chain of length N , the sender chooses two nonces, r
and hN and generates the chain by feeding back the output of a preimage
resistant hash function as the input. That is, hi 1 = H(rjjhi), where the jj
operation denotes concatenation. Figure 3.4 illustrates the generation of a
hash chain of length N . The nonce r is used to avoid reusing a hash value
of other ows.
To allow each CRAFT router to authenticate Packet IDs, a sender includes
in its CRAFT connection initiation packet the values of r and h0. Each
CRAFT router stores the values r and h0 to authenticate future hash values.
When the sender sends Packet ID m, it includes the hash value hm in the
hash eld of the CRAFT header.
When a CRAFT router receives a new packet, it can authenticate the
Packet ID by traversing the hash chain. For example, when the CRAFT
router receives Packet ID 1 with hash element h0, it will verify thatH(rjjh0) =
h0, and if so, the CRAFT router will know that h1 = h
0. Since the crypto-
graphic hash function is preimage resistant, it is computationally infeasible
for other users to generate hi from hi 1.
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3.6.3 Connection-Request Flooding Attack
Since CRAFT guarantees that each ow is TCP-fair, an attacker that ob-
tains a large number of CRAFT ows is at an advantage over a normal user
that uses only a single CRAFT ow. Furthermore, an excessive number of
CRAFT ows traversing a single CRAFT router can result in the exhaustion
of that router's available memory.
To guarantee that a new user can establish a CRAFT ow, and to ensure
that the number of ows that a user can establish is per-computation-fair,
we use computational puzzles (as in Portcullis [33]) to allocate CRAFT ows
at each router. We also ensure that ows that have not recently solved a
puzzle are aged out of existence (as in Portcullis) in order to ensure that an
attacker cannot accumulate a large number of connections over time.
A full implementation of a CRAFT sender will attempt to establish as
many ows as it can, subject to some limitation on the fraction of CPU it
uses in order to establish these ows. Because puzzle-solving is the limiting
factor in connection establishment, such a sender will experience very limited
packet loss, though it will have a substantial computational load. It will
then stripe data across the several established ows, using a TCP-fair rate
on each established ow. The receiver will use header information in each
CRAFT packet to reassemble the packets into a stream for the higher-layer
application.
3.6.4 Packet Header Exhaustion Attack
An attacker can also attempt to exhaust the memory space of each packet
header. In each CRAFT packet header, a limited memory space is allocated
for pre-capabilities. Thus, if an attacker lls that limited memory space
with fake pre-capabilities, no CRAFT router can monitor the ow since no
CRAFT router can insert its pre-capabilities into the packet header.
When a CRAFT router cannot verify that packets of a particular ow
are received and acknowledged according to the TCP standard, the CRAFT
router assigns that ow with insucient packet header memory to use the
legacy portion of the link controlled by the CRAFT router. Thus, there is
no incentive for an attacker to exhaust the packet header space.
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3.6.5 Imperfections in TCP Feedback
Because TCP congestion control measures the cwnd according to bytes ac-
knowledged and not the total number of bytes outstanding, and because
packet sizes can vary, an attacker could exploit these dierences to temporar-
ily overwhelm a link protected by CRAFT. For example, after an attacker
acquires a sizable cwnd, he can send multiple 1-byte packets, each of which
comes with its own IP and CRAFT header. An attacker can thus easily ood
the network with trac that is magnitudes larger than allowed by his cwnd.
Many researchers have documented the eectiveness of using small payload
to disrupt network service [47].
If an attacker sends multiple small-sized messages without changing his
maximum segment size, we can easily stop the attack by enforcing Nagle's
algorithm [48]. If an attacker seeks to defeat Nagle's algorithm and sends
multiple small-sized messages by changing his maximum segment size, then
CRAFT defends against this attack by maintaining the maximum amount
of outstanding data-plus-header.
In order to avoid such an attack, CRAFT enforces certain properties that
TCP does not require. Namely, CRAFT enforces Nagle's algorithm [48]; that
is, a CRAFT router allows each ow to have one outstanding packet that is
of size less than the maximum segment size. By enforcing Nagle's algorithm,
we can prevent an attacker from sending multiple small sized packets.
When an application needs to send a large number of small packets, it may
reduce its maximum segment size for a period of time. In CRAFT, the sender
noties all routers each time it changes the maximum segment size. When a
node increases its maximum segment size, the cwnd can remain unchanged,
because the total number of bytes that can be sent for a given cwnd decreases
as the maximum segment size increases. This is because as the maximum
segment size increases, the number of packets that can be sent for a given
cwnd decreases, thus the amount of overhead associated with those packets
also decreases.
Conversely, when decreasing the maximum segment size, the amount of
bandwidth associated with a given cwnd increases. If we allow the sender to
decrease its maximum segment size without also decreasing its cwnd, then
the attacker can temporarily send at much greater than its fair rate. Thus,
when a node decreases its maximum segment size, we adjust its cwnd to
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ensure that its old maximum data-plus-header in ight is equal to its new
maximum data-plus-header in ight, by satisfying the expression
cwndold + 
cwndold
SMSSold
= cwndnew + 
cwndnew
SMSSnew
where SMSS is the sender's maximum segment size, and  is the header
length.
3.7 Evaluation
In this section, I present the results to evaluate the overhead and the eec-
tiveness of CRAFT.
3.7.1 Experiment Methodology
Our testbed consists of a small network in our lab which is connected over
the Internet to Emulab [49], a public open network testbed. We illustrate
our testbed in Figure 3.5. The small access network in our lab consists
of two senders connected to one router, which is in turn connected to the
Internet. The receiver in Emulab is also connected to the Internet. Each
of our two senders sends TCP or UDP data to the receiver in Emulab over
the Internet. We placed the Internet between the senders and the receiver in
order to experiment with realistic cross-trac and queuing delay. The link
bandwidth between the senders and the router is 100 Mbps, and we vary the
receiver's access link from 10 Mbps to 100 Mbps.
We implemented CRAFT between network layer and transport layer in
Linux kernel version 2.6.20, including header insertion, processing, and ex-
traction steps at the senders, the router, and the receiver. Our prototype
CRAFT implementation uses 32-bit packet IDs, thus Packet ID, ACK ID,
Reordered Packet ID, and Lost Packet ID in Algorithm 2 are all 32-bit long.
Each Pre-Capability and Capability in our implementation is 3-bit long, and
the timeout (TO) ag is 1-bit long.
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Figure 3.5: Internet experiment setup.
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Figure 3.6: Fairness as evaluated by implementation. A single UDP ow,
controlled by CRAFT, competes against 1{5 legacy TCP ows.
3.7.2 Fairness Measured by Implementation
We rst examine how a CRAFT-compliant UDP ow shares bandwidth with
other TCP ows. We let A be a group of TCP senders; and B, a single
UDP sender with 10 Mbps source rate. We then let each sender in A send
packets to a receiver using TCP Reno; and let B send packets using CRAFT.
That is, B generates a 10 Mbps UDP trac, but only transmits data at a
CRAFT-compliant rate. All ows from A and B converge at a CRAFT
router before entering the Internet and eventually reach the destination as
shown in Figure 3.5. We implemented a user-level program to send CRAFT
acknowledgments in the reverse direction in order to make a unidirectional
UDP ow compatible with CRAFT.
We measure the throughput of B's CRAFT-compliant ow and the aggre-
gate throughput of A's TCP ows while varying the number of TCP ows
at A from 1 to 5. Figure 3.6 shows our results. The thin solid line rep-
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Figure 3.7: CRAFT packet overhead results.
resents the bandwidth that each ow would get if all ows enjoy the same
portion of link bandwidth. The bold solid line shows the throughput of B,
the CRAFT-compliant UDP ow. We observe that the CRAFT-compliant
ow enjoys 20% to 55% higher throughput than its fair share.
The dierence between CRAFT-compliant rate and the fair share can be
attributed to TCP ows using delayed acknowledgments. The TCP standard
recommends sending one acknowledgment for every other received packets as
long as the packets meet some timing criteria. However, CRAFT limits ow
rates using the maximum TCP rate, and since the TCP cwnd grows faster
when the receiver acknowledges each packet instead of every other packet,
CRAFT does not use delayed acknowledgments, thereby allowing a ow to
gain higher throughput than the fair share.
3.7.3 Overhead Measured by Implementation
To enforce TCP congestion control to each ow, CRAFT incurs two types
of overhead: packet header overhead and processing overhead. The packet
header overhead decreases the amount of goodput with a given maximum
segment size (mss) and the processing overhead increases the time a router
takes to forward a packet.
Packet header overhead. A CRAFT ow stores several extra information
in the packet header, thus reducing the maximum amount of data sent in each
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Table 3.1: Processing times for router functions
Function Processing time
Creation of a new ow 3120ns
Lookup of ow 30ns
Calculation of hash 1720ns
Verication of capability 300ns
Update of cwnd 170ns
Calculation of pre-capability 610ns
packet with a given mss. The reduced goodput can be calculated theoretically
as
(mss  CRAFT)
mss
 goodputoriginal
where CRAFT is the size of the CRAFT header and goodputoriginal is the
goodput of a ow without CRAFT deployment. Since the size of CRAFT
header varies due to various optional elds, such as Reordered Packet IDs
and Lost Packet IDs, we do not calculate a theoretic packet overhead, but
instead determine it experimentally.
To determine the impact of the packet header overhead, we consider a TCP
sender sending trac through the Internet and Emulab to the receiver. We
then compare the goodput of the TCP ow when CRAFT is in use to that
of a normal TCP ow. We vary the access link bandwidth between 10 Mbps
and 100 Mbps, and perform 5 runs for every data point. Figure 3.7 shows the
mean TCP goodput for each access link rate and the 95% condence intervals
of the average. These results show that the legacy TCP ow provides 2.03%
to 15.33% higher goodput than that of CRAFT.
When the access link bandwidth is under 60 Mbps, the dierence between
the goodputs of the two ows is not signicant. We observe the biggest
dierence between goodputs when the access link bandwidth is 90 Mbps. The
goodputs of both CRAFT and normal TCP levels o when the access link
bandwidth is between 60 to 90 Mbps, we believe that this leveling behavior is
caused by trac shaping somewhere outside of our control and is irrelevant
to the CRAFT overhead.
Processing overhead. Upon receiving a CRAFT packet, a CRAFT router
performs several operations: looking up the ow, checking the validity of the
hash, verifying the capability, updating the congestion window, and generat-
ing a new pre-capability. We use a single core of a 3 GHz Xeon processor to
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measure the processing times required by our implementation of these func-
tions. In particular, we use SHA256 to generate and verify the hash chain,
and use RC5 to generate pre-capabilities. Table 3.1 shows the measured
processing time for each functional block.
Our results show that a single core of a Xeon processor can handle about
353,357 packets per second. At a minimum packet size of a 20 byte IP
header and 28 byte CRAFT header, this represents a bandwidth exceeding
135.7 Mbps. At a more realistic packet size of 1500 bytes, this represents
4.24 Gbps. Thus low bandwidth routers can use a slow processor since the
processing requirement is low, and a high-bandwidth router can implement
these functions on a FPGA or ASIC to process even more quickly than the
Xeon CPU. These numbers are for our particular implementation of CRAFT,
and might be improved in future implementations. Our measured processing
times thus serve as a lower bound for CRAFT performance.
3.7.4 Simulation Methodology
To evaluate the eectiveness of CRAFT, we would like to see the eect
of a DoS attack in a network with only partial deployment. Though we
have shown through implementation that a CRAFT-controlled ow com-
petes fairly with legacy ows, the best way to understand the dierences
between CRAFT and other previously proposed capability-based DoS de-
fense schemes is to launch a DoS attack. For ethical reasons we could only
implement this attack through simulation. We used the ns-2 [16] simulator
and construct a network topology that reects the topological properties of
the Internet. We compare the performance between SIFF [30], TVA [31] and
CRAFT. We do not consider lter-based systems [32, 38] and the denial-of-
capability defense system, Portcullis [33], since they are orthogonal to our
capability-based approach. To simulate the performance of SIFF and TVA,
we use the simulation package published by the authors of StopIt [32] and
TVA [31].
There is no standard methodology for evaluating DoS defense mechanisms.
We generally follow the intended methodology used in the recent work of
Liu et al. [32]. Our intended simulation scenario includes 1K to 10M com-
promised hosts sending trac at rate of 10 Kbps each. All trac traverses a
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Figure 3.8: Simulation topology: we construct an AS-level topology using a
data set of hop-by-hop delay measurements from the Internet. In the access
network of receivers, there is a shared link not deploying capability-based
systems.
bottleneck link that has a 1 Gbps capacity. Due to memory constraints, we
adopt a 1/200 scale in our simulation while maintaining the ratio between
the aggregate attack trac and bottleneck link. Namely, our actual simu-
lation is done using 1 to 5000 compromised hosts sending trac at rate of
10 Kbps, and the capacity of the bottleneck link is subsequently reduced to
500 Kbps. Our simulation topology is shown in Figure 3.8.
We set the bottleneck link as a legacy link that does not support SIFF,
TVA, or CRAFT. This legacy link may, for example, exist in an autonomous
system that has not yet deployed a capability system. Because the legacy link
does not support the capability system, when the legacy link can no longer
sustain the trac sent by the attackers, it will start dropping packets. We
then simulated ten legitimate TCP end hosts each trying to send 100 les,
each of size 20 KB. Each sender sends one le at a time, after the delivery
of the previous le is complete. A le delivery is considered complete either
when the entire le is successfully transferred, or after the le experiences
8 timeouts, at which point the le transfer is considered to have failed. We
then measure the fraction of le transfers that successfully complete and the
average transfer time of the legitimate users' successful le transfers. These
metrics represent how well TCP trac can compete against the attackers
when a capability-based DoS defense mechanism is only partially deployed.
To build a realistic topology in the Internet, we use the IPv4 Routed /24
Topology Dataset [50] constructed from CAIDA scamper probes, a successor
of skitter [51]. Scamper probes record the IP addresses of each hop from a
source to a destination and round trip times of intermediate hop as well as
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a nal destination. The destinations are randomly collected from the routed
IPv4 /24 prexes in the BGP tables of the RouteViews project [52]. By
using the BGP tables to translate IP addresses of intermediate hops into AS
numbers, we construct an AS-level topology in which each link has inter-AS
delay. We use an August 2008 dataset measured in San Jose. A topology with
delay is necessary to accurately model TCP performance because congestion
window evolution depends on round trip time between end hosts [53]. To
our knowledge, there is no Internet-scale link-bandwidth data, so we set core
routers' link bandwidth of our topology 10 Gbps so that the core routers do
not experience from congestion. Figure 3.8 shows the simulation topology
including access networks, where ten legitimate users are connected to a
single common access AS and attackers' access ASes are chosen at random.
There exists a legacy link that does not deploy capability-based systems; this
link is shared by all attackers and legitimate users, and is denoted by the
thin segment in the box in Figure 3.8. The thick lines indicate links on which
the capability system is deployed.
3.7.5 Simulation Results
Figure 3.9 shows the fraction of le transfer completion and the average
transfer time of les. When the number of attackers is less than 100K, the
aggregate attack trac is less than the capacity of the legacy link. Hence, all
le transfer are successful and the average le transfer times for all evaluated
schemes are similar. When there are 100K attackers, the aggregate attack
trac rate matches the bottleneck link bandwidth. All les are still suc-
cessfully transferred, but due to queuing at the bottleneck link, the average
transfer time increases. Specically, CRAFT system experienced a 18-fold
increase while SIFF and TVA both experienced a 68-fold increase in the
average transfer time as shown in Figure 3.9(b).
CRAFT signicantly outperforms SIFF and TVA in this situation because
attackers are limited by the CRAFT rate, thereby allowing legitimate users to
complete le transfer faster than users using other DoS-prevention schemes.
When the number of attackers exceeds 100K, almost all le transfer attempts
fail under SIFF and TVA, and the average success transfer time increases
sharply. CRAFT, on the other hand, provides perfect le transfer success
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Figure 3.9: Simulation results.
rates, and the growth rate of the average transfer time is much smaller. A
legacy link in a system that partially deploys SIFF and TVA cannot provide
fair service even though the ows going through the legacy link come from
users deploying SIFF or TVA. In contrast, in a partially deployed CRAFT
system, the attack trac and the legitimate trac both reduce their trac
rates and share the bottleneck link in a TCP-fair manner.
3.7.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that a CRAFT router can limit all ows beyond the
router to share network bandwidth in a TCP-fair manner when using short
capability. TCP-fairness can be formally dened by a utility function in an
optimization-based framework [54]; however, we dene TCP-fairness loosely
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to be the behavior of the network when all ows adhere to TCP congestion
control specications.
We rst show that, when a CRAFT router is using short capability, the
rate of any given ow beyond that CRAFT router must be limited by the
CRAFT rate, which is dened to be the rate allocated by CRAFT to a ow
given a loss pattern in a network. We then argue that the CRAFT rate
is TCP-fair. That is, a CRAFT ow must adhere to the TCP congestion
control algorithm.
To show that the rate of a ow is limited by the CRAFT rate, we observe
that a CRAFT router disregards all packets with invalid capabilities. That
is, if a ow wishes to increase its rate above the CRAFT rate, it needs to send
more capabilities than it receives. However, an attacker cannot consistently
predict future acknowledgments, and too many erroneous attempts will cause
the CRAFT router to force the attacker to switch to using long capabilities,
thus further reducing the success rate of guessing. Moreover, since the rate
can only monotonically decrease as the ow traverses more CRAFT routers,
a single CRAFT router (namely the closest one to the sender) is able to limit
the ow rate below CRAFT rate.
When a CRAFT ow uses long capability, an attacker could potentially
argue that someone else is trying to spoof the capability, thereby evading any
penalties and CRAFT rate limit. However, with a 32-bit long capability, only
one in 232 excess packets carries a valid capability. To put this in perspective,
an attacker ooding an OC-768 link at line-speed can only squeeze 9.3 bps
past the rst CRAFT router. Each additional CRAFT router provides a
further reduction in bandwidth.
We now argue that CRAFT ows and regular TCP ows could share a link
with TCP-fairness on a legacy link. It is immediately obvious that a TCP
ow would share the link with a CRAFT ow in a TCP-fair manner. That
is, without considering what the CRAFT ow does, the TCP ow adheres
to TCP congestion control. In the other direction, without considering the
TCP ow, the CRAFT ow is limited by its CRAFT rate, which is in turn
determined using the TCP congestion control standard. That is, the CRAFT
ow must also be TCP-fair. Therefore, CRAFT ows and other TCP ows
are able to share a legacy link in a TCP-fair manner.
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3.8 Discussion
3.8.1 Various avors of TCP
As introduced in Section 3.3.2, we handle various avor of TCP by emu-
lating TCP specied in RFC 2581 [1] in the most aggressive way. Several
congestion controls and bandwidth allocation mechanisms do not follow the
TCP congestion control stated in RFC 2581. As such, the current version
of CRAFT cannot accurately emulate the state of these ows and might
not support ows using these congestion control algorithms. Namely, several
TCP variants are not supported by CRAFT's congestion control. These TCP
variants behave dierently from RFC 2581 in two respects: congestion deter-
mination and window evolution. For example, TCP Vegas [55] uses increase
in measured delay as a sign of congestion instead of the triple duplicate ac-
knowledgments used by RFC 2581. Also, BIC TCP [56] varies the congestion
window dierently from the protocol specied in RFC 2581. Though these
variants are not currently supported by CRAFT, as long as these variants are
still TCP-friendly, future versions of CRAFT could allow for user selection
of multiple state-tracking strategies.
3.8.2 Deployment Model
Routers. I have presented in Section 3.7.6 why a CRAFT router can protect
all downstream links from upstream trac. That is, a network provider can
protect its internal links by upgrading only its border routers. Moreover, if
a service provider trusts one of its neighbors more than another, the service
provider can rst deploy CRAFT at the border router with the neighbor
that is less trusted. A provider need not deploy CRAFT on all hosts at
once; instead, a provider can slowly phase out its legacy links. CRAFT thus
allows a provider to avoid both expensive one-time cost and complicated
simultaneous deployment.
End-Hosts. Moreover, the service provider can lessen the end users' burden
of software upgrade by installing CRAFT proxies in the customer's access
network. The proxies then can process and forward all capabilities and pre-
capabilities on the users' behalf.
Applications. Applications that use a non-TCP transport protocol can still
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be used with CRAFT. When a UDP ow wants to send at a rate less than
its CRAFT rate, all packets associated with that ow are sent as CRAFT
packets. When such UDP ow wants to exceed its CRAFT rate, it selects the
least important packets and sends them as best-eort (i.e. using the legacy
portion of CRAFT links), so that the packets that are important are sent
with higher priority at no more than the CRAFT rate.
3.9 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented the CRAFT protocol to provide a high
level of security against misbehaving users, by enforcing TCP-fairness on all
ows that have traversed a CRAFT router. The central goal of CRAFT is
to achieve a system where a CRAFT-enabled router can prevent a ow from
causing unfairness on any downstream link, even if the link is surrounded by
legacy routers.
A single CRAFT router can protect all links behind it; thus CRAFT can be
deployed with a little cost. Our experiments show that CRAFT incurs little
overhead in packet header size and computation time. Our simulations show
that in realistic partial-deployment environments, CRAFT can signicantly
outperform previously suggested defense mechanisms in both packet delivery
success rate and average data transfer time.
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CHAPTER 4
A DEPLOYABLE DOS DEFENSE FOR
WEB APPLICATIONS
In this chapter, I consider the management of network link bandwidth with
the design focus of deployability. I dene deployability, outline challenges for
deployable DoS defense, and introduce Mirage, our design of deployable DoS
defense for web applications. This work is the result of a collaboration with
Dr. Prateek Mittal, Prof. Yih-Chun Hu and Prof. Matthew Caesar.
4.1 Introduction
While extensive academic works on DoS defense in the Internet [29{38] have
been done over a decade, little progress has been made on real-world deploy-
ment. A fundamental obstacle to deployment is that a deploying AS does
not benet until other ASes also participate in the scheme. This dependency
between ASes is a chicken-and-egg problem for deployment in the Internet,
which traditionally does not force a protocol to be deployed. The design of
Phalanx [57] aims to reduce the number of ASes that are required to deploy
the protocol for eective DoS defense, but does not completely solve the
chicken-and-egg problem.
In this chapter, we propose Mirage, a DoS defense mechanism that aims to
remove the required deployment at other ASes as much as possible. Towards
this end, we adopt an approach similar to frequency hopping in wireless net-
works [58]: in Mirage, a destination end host varies its IP addresses according
to a pseudorandom sequence known only to authorized hosts. Knowledge of
an active IP address owned by the destination end host acts as an implicit
authorization to send data. This property enables Mirage to reduce the re-
quired deployment of other ASes. To realize this idea in a concrete system,
we leverage known ideas: computational puzzle, ltering and fair queueing.
Our key contribution is a system architecture that integrates these existing
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primitives with the novel paradigm of IP address hopping, with the goal of
reducing the need for deployment across organizational boundaries. The se-
curity of Mirage depends on the space of IP addresses that a destination end
host can use. To get a suciently large space of IP addresses, each Mirage-
protected server uses its IPv6 prex and chooses interface addresses as these
secret addresses. The practicality of Mirage will grow each day with the
increasing deployment of IPv6 and the ability of IPv4-only-connected hosts
to use IPv6 through tunneling, as described in Section 4.3.1. Randomly
hopping IP addresses play the same role as capabilities in capability-based
approaches, which in contrast to Mirage, introduce a completely new packet
header.
We evaluate Mirage using large-scale simulations and a prototype imple-
mentation on PlanetLab. We nd that Mirage is able to provide honest
nodes with their fair share of system resources, comparable to previous DoS
mitigation mechanisms. At the same time, Mirage is able to provide some
benets to a server when only the server's local network and its upstream
ISP deploy it. Unlike previous proposals, Mirage only requires functionality
from routers that is already deployed in today's routers, though this func-
tionality may need to be scaled depending on the point of deployment. In
particular, Mirage does not require router hardware or software modications
to support new headers/elds in network packets, and achieves this without
changing the semantics of existing header elds. Our architecture also does
not require any cryptography at the routers. Finally, source end hosts can
take advantage of Mirage-protected sites without installing any software. We
nd that our design provides a rst step towards a deployable, yet eective
DoS defense.
We start by discussing related work in Section 4.2 and our overall design
in Section 4.3. We then present Mirage in detail in Section 4.4 and 4.5.
We evaluate our design with simulations and a prototype implementation in
Section 4.6. And then, we compare deployment requirements with other ap-
proaches in Section 4.7. In Section 4.8, we propose scalable designs. Finally,
we present a comparison of Mirage's deployment properties with previous
proposals in Section 4.9 and summarize a discussion of ramications in Sec-
tion 4.10.
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4.2 Related Work
Filtering and rate limiting: Pushback [37] defends against DoS at-
tacks by having congested routers rate limit the set of ows responsible for
congestion (aggregate rate limiting). If local rate limiting is not sucient
to mitigate congestion/DoS attacks, then the router contacts its upstream
router and asks it to perform rate limiting as well. We note that rate limiting
an aggregate set of ows does not guarantee fair sharing of resources amongst
honest trac and bot trac. AITF [38] is a trac ltering architecture that
leverages record routing techniques to enable a victim to identify routers
close to a source. The victim can then install lters close to the source of
attack trac. StopIt [32] proposes a ltering mechanism whereby a receiver
can request a particular ow to be blocked for a period of time.
While ltering-based schemes are powerful, they face signicant practi-
cal hurdles, as they assume the ability to dierentiate attack trac from
legitimate trac. Adversaries may make use of cover trac to hide their
communication, or may mimic legitimate trac (e.g., by mimicking legit-
imate GET requests). Mirage does not make any assumptions about the
ability to classify malicious trac; however, if a method to dierentiate at-
tack trac is available, Mirage can leverage it to provide a signicant subset
of the requisite ltering capability.
Capabilities: Capability-based schemes provide the receiver an ability to
directly control its reachability within the network. When a sender wants
to transmit packets to a receiver, the receiver decides whether to permit it
and lets routers know its decision. Then, the router allows the corresponding
packets to pass. SIFF [30] gives a technique to eciently allow receivers to
authorize senders to transmit. A router sends tokens to a receiver that can be
used to authorize sender requests. When a receiver wants to receive packets
from the sender, the receiver passes the token to a sender. The sender adds
the token to packet headers it transmits to get a preferential service from
the router. TVA [31] renes SIFF to defend against brute-force attacks to
improve practicality and eciency. Portcullis [33] addresses a vulnerability
in both SIFF and TVA where an attacker could launch a denial of capability
attack, and prevent the initial request packets of honest users from reaching
the victim. Portcullis makes use of computational puzzles to force requesting
users to perform work before being able to access the initial request channel.
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In Section 4.7, we discuss the deployment challenges for capability-based
schemes, including the problem of low benet for early adopters, the need to
upgrade client end-host software, as well as requiring new router primitives
such as cryptographic support. Additionally, we note that in most of the
above approaches, the capability to send a packet is specic to the path used
to route a packet to a destination. Thus, route changes in the Internet pose
a signicant challenge for these approaches. In contrast, Mirage uses the
knowledge of an active destination IP address within the IP address range of
the destination end host as an implicit authorization to send data. Such an
authorization mechanism is end-to-end, and is not aected by route changes
in the Internet.
Other approaches: Phalanx [57] proposes to use a swarm, a large pool
of geographically and topologically distributed well provisioned machines to
absorb the DoS attack, and forward legitimate trac to the victim. Once a
few ASes deploy an adequate number of such well provisioned machines to
form an overlay network, any ISP can gain immediate benet from deploying
Phalanx. While the design of Phalanx is a signicant improvement over
prior work in this domain, it still requires other ASes to deploy the protocol
and participate in an overlay network. NetFence [34] proposes to use the
network as the rst line of defense to mitigate DoS attacks, but assumes that
IP spoong is not possible. Speak-up [59] uses proof of work techniques for
DoS defense, but its focus is on application-layer attacks. Kandula et al. [60]
propose another defense mechanism for application-layer attacks, wherein
users solve CAPTCHAs to dierentiate themselves from bots. Mirage does
not require users to solve CAPTCHAs and focuses on network layer ooding
attacks. Keromytis et al. [61] propose an approach where only select nodes in
an overlay network are allowed to communicate with a destination, and their
IP addresses are kept hidden. Pre-authorized users are given knowledge of a
subset of those select nodes, and can use them as a proxy to communicate
with a destination. Mirage builds upon the idea of hiding proxy IP addresses
by introducing the notion of destination IP address hopping. Mirage does
not require the use of proxies or overlay networks, and provides service to all
users (not just pre-authorized users).
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4.3 Mirage Overview
We next describe some goals and limitations of our work. Then, we explain
how we design our architecture to achieve the design goals.
4.3.1 Design Goals and Limitations
The design goals of our architecture are as follows.
1. Incremental and incentivized deployment: We target an incremen-
tally deployable design where a small number of routers should be able
to deploy Mirage and bring immediate benet to downstream servers. We
note that in such a design, local business objectives may incentivize deploy-
ment. Our architecture should not interfere with operation of existing or
non-upgraded network protocols or systems. Mechanisms that introduce ad-
ditional packet headers or protocol layers may not satisfy this property. For
instance, schemes that introduce additional headers can face signicant chal-
lenges during incremental deployment, due to incompatibilities with scrub-
bing and IDS services, layer-7 and layer-4 load balancing, and other middle-
boxes and network services that inspect non-IP layers of the network stack.
2. Lowering deployment cost: We target a design which minimizes the
requirement for cooperation across administrative or trust boundaries, and
does not rely on an external overlay network to deploy the mechanism. Mech-
anisms that require the use of trusted hardware [62], or that require end users
to upgrade software, face major deployment hurdles and are incompatible
with our design goals. Similarly, we avoid reliance on new primitives from
routers, such as router cryptography and additional packet headers, which
require signicant support from vendors and increase the cost of network
equipment.
3. Network fairness: In the absence of techniques to classify attack trac,
we aim to provide each user with its fair share of the network. However, if
techniques to partially classify attack trac are available, then Mirage can
leverage them.
4. Low overhead: We target a design that does not impose additional cost
on the network or end hosts when the system is not under attack (adaptive
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defense).
Limitations: Our work has several limitations. First, like other schemes
that use puzzles, such as Portcullis and Phalanx, Mirage requires the ability
to distribute cryptographic information (puzzles) in a manner that is not
subject to DoS. Mirage can use existing replicated services such as Akamai
or well provisioned cloud services such as Amazon S3 or even DNS. Second,
Mirage requires a large IP address space to perform eectively. To achieve
this, Mirage can make use of IPv6. The Internet is already in a transition
phase to IPv6 [63], and we note that IANA has already exhausted its pool of
IPv4 allocation blocks in February 2011 [64]. Mirage is able to accommodate
scenarios where source end hosts are in an IPv4 only network, by the use
IPv4-IPv6 translators. For example, Teredo IPv6 tunneling [65] is already
built into Windows. Mirage can even protect destination end-hosts serviced
by an IPv4 network; in such scenarios, the victim sets up a tunnel to a IPv6
provider that supports Mirage. To protect against native IPv4 DoS, the
victim either keeps its IPv4 address secret, or requests its ISP to block any
trac that does not originate from the tunnel server. We emphasize that,
in contrast to Mirage's approach of leveraging IPv6, prior work on capabil-
ity advocates a completely new packet header. Third, our design requires
loose time synchronization, on the order of tens of seconds. To address this,
Mirage may require external systems such as NTP, which can provide time
synchronization with accuracies on the order of hundreds of milliseconds on
wide area networks [66]. Fourth, Mirage targets per computation fairness. If
the ratio of honest sources' computational power to the total computational
power of all nodes (honest nodes and attacker nodes) is r, then Mirage pro-
vides the honest nodes with a fraction r of the bottleneck link bandwidth. In
scenarios where there is a mismatch between the computational resources of
the attacker and the honest nodes (for example, a webserver with a small user
base being attacked by a very large botnet), the fair share of the honest nodes
will be small. We note that this limitation is also shared by other state of the
art mechanisms that rely on computational puzzles, such as Portcullis [33]
and Phalanx [57]. Another aspect related to the issue of resource mismatch
is the dierences in computational capabilities of various devices, such as a
smart phone and a high end GPU. However, Mirage is compatible with the
use of memory-bound puzzles [67], which have been shown to lower resource
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disparity between devices.
Threat model: The focus of this chapter is on network-layer DoS attacks,
where the attacker attempts to overwhelm transmission capabilities of the
underlying network. We assume the adversary may have access to a large
number of hosts (e.g., via ownership of a botnet). We assume routers can be
compromised, though we note that a compromised router can always block
trac towards the victim. We assume source end hosts may perform IP
spoong.
4.3.2 System Architecture
IP address hopping: To mitigate denial of service attacks, we need some
way to make it harder for the attacker to reach the server. In previous
approaches, capabilities or randomly chosen proxies (Phalanx [57]) are used
for that purpose. However, these approaches add a new packet header and
require deployment in other ASes thereby hindering incentivized deployment.
Mirage's approach is to use randomly changing destination IP addresses.
This idea enables Mirage to avoid the necessity of other ASes' deployment.
Mirage consists of a set of add-ons to existing Internet services (Figure 4.1)
that enable a server to dynamically hop (change) its IP address. In particular,
the server is assigned a set of IP addresses, and repeatedly modulates the
address it uses from this set via a deterministic pseudorandom function.
This function computes the server's current IP address given the current
time as input. The server can then share that pseudorandom function with
authenticated clients; these clients can then determine the IP address used
by the server by computing the pseudorandom function.
Slowing the attacker with computation-limited hopping functions: While
certain Internet services can authenticate clients (e.g., systems that use
CAPTCHAS or require the user to sign in with a secret password), other
services may be unable to distinguish valid user requests from malicious
requests. To support these services, a form of fair sharing mechanism is
necessary. Options for fair sharing include bandwidth-based fairness [59]
or computation-based fairness [33]. We do not use bandwidth-based fair-
ness since it may induce congestion collapse in network. Mirage makes it
more computationally dicult for the client to retrieve the IP address using
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the pseudorandom function. This is done by having the server construct a
computationally-harder version of the pseudorandom function, which is then
handed out to clients. This computationally-harder version is constructed
by incorporating a cryptographic puzzle into the pseudorandom function re-
turned to the client. Mirage makes use of hard-to-DoS infrastructures such
as Akamai, DNS or well provisioned cloud services such as Amazon S3 for
puzzle distribution. It is important to note that putting all servers to cloud
services to defend against DoS attacks is expensive. Mirage uses such service
for only puzzle distribution.
Avoiding network bottlenecks with in-network ltering: Even though a server
can perform IP address hopping, an adversary can still attack the server by
sending trac to any of the alternate IP addresses assigned to the server,
even though they are not in use. To address this, Mirage leverages existing
router interfaces to perform in-network ltering. In particular, the victim
host may instruct upstream routers of IP address ranges that it is currently
not using. This may be done by a variety of mechanisms. For simplicity, our
design assumes that the end host explicitly publishes access control lists that
are serviced by upstream routers. Ideally, this ltering should be done near
bottleneck links.
Isolating the attacker with address sets: Hopping IP addresses to evade the
attacker only works when the attacker does not know the new IP address
of the server. To address this, we would like some way to make it dicult
for the attacker to know the current IP address of the server. However, this
seems dicult to do while still enabling non-malicious clients to know the
current IP address. Hence, Mirage instead attempts to constrain the eects
of malicious clients by associating a set of IP addresses with the server, and
returning dierent elements of that set to dierent clients. A DoS attack by
a malicious client can then only aect clients in its set. To achieve this, we
leverage standard techniques (such as those used by DNS [68]) to return dif-
ferent IP addresses to dierent clients based on their topological location. To
defend against attacks where a single malicious client solves a computational
puzzle and shares the puzzle solution with its colluding attackers, we need
to provide isolation across elements of the set. To do this, the server or the
bottleneck link can utilize fair queuing. We note that most current mech-
anisms attempt to isolate the attacker based on load balancing on source
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Figure 4.1: Mirage network architecture.
IP addresses. However, given that IP spoong is possible in today's net-
works, the attackers can easily game such mechanisms. Mirage's novelty lies
in enabling a load balancing mechanism based on destination IP addresses.
An example of the Mirage protocol is shown in Figure 4.1: (1) First, the
server determines a seed for a globally-known pseudorandom function, and
registers it with its puzzle server. (2) The server then begins using that
pseudorandom function to compute its currently active set of IP addresses.
This function is periodically recomputed to perform the hopping. (3) When
a host wishes to make a request, it does a DNS lookup for the victim, gets
redirected to the puzzle server, and retrieves the computational puzzle. The
user then executes the puzzle to determine the server's current IP address.
The user then sends packets to the server. The user periodically re-executes
the puzzle to keep track of the server's current IP address. (4) When a
malicious host, such as a bot, wishes to execute a request, it follows exactly
the same procedure. Due to the puzzles, the botnet cannot acquire more IP
addresses than its computational power. Finally, the network lters trac
that does not have a victim server's current IP address. Due to the per-
destination fair queuing, bandwidth is shared fairly across the destination IP
addresses, reducing power of an attacker.
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4.4 Protocol Description
In this section, we describe the basic Mirage design. In particular, we describe
the higher level functions performed by destination (receiver) end hosts (Sec-
tion 4.4.1), network routers (Section 4.4.2), puzzle servers (Section 4.4.3), and
source (sender) end hosts (Section 4.4.4). We defer the deployment details
of our protocol to Section 4.5.
4.4.1 Destination End Hosts
IP address hopping: Our core mechanism is inspired by frequency hop-
ping, used in wireless networks. Frequency hopping is a way to transmit radio
signals by rapidly switching the carrier through a pseudorandom sequence of
channels. If a receiver knows the pseudorandom sequence (e.g., if it shares
a key with the sender), it can listen on the same sequence of frequencies to
receive the transmission. Doing this can make wireless devices less suscep-
tible to \jamming" attacks, which attempt to deny service by transmitting
undesired trac on a communication channel.
In our work, we apply this idea to make end hosts less susceptible to
denial of service attacks. In particular, end hosts are assigned a consecutive
range (prex) of IP addresses. The sender and receiver then periodically hop
through a pseudorandom sequence of IP addresses when communicating. We
assume IPv6, to improve feasibility of allocating multiple IP addresses to end
hosts, given IPv6's larger address space (IPv6 addresses are 128 bits, with
64 bit subnet/interface addresses). More generally, instead of having a single
active IP address, end hosts can choose to have a set of active IP addresses
from amongst their allocated range. This set of active IP addresses will
periodically change. Each end host performs IP address hopping using a
local cryptographic master key. At any instance of time, the master key can
be used to determine the set of active IP addresses for that end host. This
is done using the following computation:
IP (i) = PREFIXjjH(ENCKEY (ijjTIME))
where IP (i) denotes the end host's i'th active IP address, PREFIX is the
prex IP address associated with the end host, jj represents the concatenation
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operation, H is a cryptographically secure hash function with output length
128   jPREFIXj bits, and ENCKEY (x) is the encryption of x with the
key KEY . This set of active IP addresses is kept a secret, and will only
be used under a DoS attack. In addition to this secret set of IP addresses
(which keep changing), the end hosts also maintain a static (not hopped) IP
address, which is used when the host is not under a DoS attack.
Puzzle server redirection: As in the current Internet architecture, desti-
nation end hosts set up a DNS entry for their hostname. Under a DoS attack,
a destination end host (victim server) re-registers with its authoritative DNS
(ADNS) to point its record to the puzzle server, using similar techniques to
those used in CDNs for redirection and load balancing (e.g., small TTL).
From that point onwards, the source end hosts are redirected to the puzzle
servers.
Filtering requests to routers: Under a DoS attack, the victim com-
municates the current set of active IP addresses to its upstream ASes. The
upstream ASes can then block incoming trac to any of the remaining IP
addresses which are not in the active set. Thus, knowledge of any active
IP address can be used as an implicit authorization to send data to that
destination end host.
Leveraging attack trac identication: Note that in the absence of the
ability to identify attack trac, Mirage aims to provide per computational
fairness to clients. However, if it is possible to identify attack trac, then
Mirage can leverage this ability to improve performance for honest clients.
In particular, the victim server can stop using the destination IP addresses
corresponding to attack trac, and request the upstream ASes to lter those
IP addresses.
4.4.2 Routers
Filtering trac with existing router interfaces: Whenever a victim is
under a DoS attack, the upstream routers receive information about the set
of active IP addresses currently in use by the victim. The upstream routers
can then lter out incoming trac to all remaining (non-active) IP addresses
(as well as other IP addresses that are identied by the victim as being
associated with attack trac). Note that the victim can start by installing
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lters at its edge router, and continue this process at the routers further
upstream until its link is no longer congested. In Section 4.5 we show that
the upstream ASes can perform such ltering using existing router interfaces
such as access control lists (ACLs) congured via iBGP feeds from IRSCP [69]
style management servers.
Per-destination fair queueing: After ltering out packets with non-
active destination IP addresses, the upstream routers perform fair queueing
per destination. This results in per destination address fair allocation of re-
sources when attack trac cannot be distinguished from legitimate trac.
We note that routers already support fair queueing as an option, easily en-
abled via conguration changes. We discuss this in more detail in Section 4.5.
The combination of these techniques results in the attack trac being
ltered before the bottleneck link, as well as fair allocation of bandwidth
resources.
4.4.3 Puzzle Servers
Under a DoS attack, source end hosts are redirected to a puzzle server.
Active IP address generation: The puzzle server shares a cryptographic
key with the destination end host. The puzzle server can use the end host's
cryptographic key to derive a set of the end host's active IP addresses at any
instance of time (as discussed in Section 4.4.1).
Computational puzzles: When a source end host rst contacts the puz-
zle server, it responds with a computational puzzle. Upon receiving a solu-
tion to the computational puzzle from the requesting node, the server sends
back an ephemeral active IP address of the destination end host. We use
Portcullis [33] to implement the computational puzzles aspect.
4.4.4 Source End Hosts
The source end hosts rst contact the DNS server to resolve the hostname for
the destination end host. If there is no DoS attack on the destination, they
receive the conventional static non-hopping IP address for the destination.
On the other hand, the source end hosts are redirected to a puzzle server
during a DoS attack. The source end hosts then contact the puzzle server to
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Figure 4.2: Puzzle construction. The active IP address of the server is the
puzzle solution.
obtain an ephemeral active IP address for the destination. The puzzle server
rst asks it to solve a computational puzzle. The source end host solves the
computational puzzle and sends it to the puzzle server. The puzzle server
returns an ephemeral active IP address of the destination, which can be used
to receive service.
4.5 Deployment Details
In this section, we describe several extensions to the basic Mirage design
that simplify deployment, enhance performance, and oer other improved
properties.
4.5.1 Puzzle Server
Eliminating puzzle verication: In the Mirage design described so far,
the puzzle server issues the computational puzzle seed to the clients, veries
that the clients have solved the puzzle correctly, and sends an active IP ad-
dress to the clients. We can simplify the complexity at the puzzle servers by
having the active IP addresses be the solution to the computational puzzles.
This way, the puzzle servers act purely as computational puzzle seed genera-
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tion and distribution servers. Since IP addresses are puzzle solutions, notice
that the destination end-host must be able to eciently compute the puzzle
solutions, since it would need to put the results of the computational puzzle
in the network ACLs. We term this feature to be a trapdoor computational
puzzle. We now provide constructions for such a trapdoor puzzle.
As before, let us assume that the destination end host and the puzzle server
share a key. The destination end host and the puzzle server can compute the
set of active IP addresses as before, i.e.,
IP (i) = PREFIXjjH(ENCKEY (ijjTIME))
Let us denote the rst 64 bits of the destination end host's IP address as
the PREFIX. We denote the last 64 bits of IP (i) as IPSUFFIX(i) (equal
to H(ENCKEY (ijjTIME))). Let KEY 2 be a publicly known symmetric
key. Let R be a random number. Now, the puzzle server rst computes the
following:
ENCKEY 2(RjjIPSUFFIX(i)) = CIPHERi
Next, the puzzle server issues the following to the client: the PREFIX,
the r bit random number R and all but the last d bits of CIPHERi, where d
is the diculty level of the puzzle. The job of the client is to iterate through
each of the 2d possible values of CIPHERi, decrypt the result using the
symmetric key KEY 2, and check if the rst r bits of the decryption match
the random number R. Upon nding a match, the client can uncover a single
IP address by appending the last 64 bits of the decryption to the PREFIX.
Figure 4.2 illustrates this computational puzzle design.
Eliminating need to trust puzzle servers: We now extend Mirage to
use the puzzle servers as untrusted puzzle distribution servers. The main
idea is that the destination end host can communicate the puzzles directly to
the puzzle server, so that puzzle server does not have to generate the puzzle.
Moreover, by using the previous extension (Section 4.5.1) where the active
IP address is the solution to the puzzle, the puzzle server does not need
to do any verication, eliminating the need for cryptography at the puzzle
server. The destination end host can simply chose a random set of active
IP addresses, generate the puzzles as in the previous extension, and store
them at the puzzle server. In this fashion, the puzzle server does not need to
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be trusted with the destination end host's active IP addresses. Note that a
malicious puzzle server could share the puzzles with the attackers ahead of
time, enabling the attackers to precompute the puzzle solutions. To mitigate
this attack, we propose that the destination end host upload the puzzles at
the puzzle server every hopping time interval.
Eliminating puzzle server as a bottleneck: So far, we had assumed
that the adversary could not launch a DoS attack on the puzzle server. Since
the puzzle servers simply need to serve static puzzles and can be untrusted
(due to mechanisms described in Section 4.5.1), the destination end-host
can ensure availability of puzzle seeds by simple replication. For instance,
the puzzles could be hosted on Akamai or can be widely replicated across
cloud service providers such as Amazon S3. The adversary would need to
DoS all of the replicas in order to DoS the destination. Note that dierent
replicas could either store dierent puzzles, or use standard CDN approaches
to return dierent puzzle objects to dierent source end hosts.
4.5.2 End-hosts
Legacy source end hosts: We now discuss how source end hosts can
take advantage of Mirage protected sites without installing additional soft-
ware. When the source end host performs a DNS lookup for the destination
end host, it is redirected to a DoS-resistant puzzle server (can be hosted by
Akamai), which sets up a frameset with a JavaScript applet in one frame
and a blank page in another frame. The applet solves the puzzle to obtain
the active IP address, and redirects the blank page frame to the active IP
address. In this fashion, any standards-compliant browser can view a Mi-
rage protected site. Clients that do not use JavaScript can be directed to a
best eort service. The ability to access Mirage protected websites without
installing any software makes our design most suitable for web applications.
Achieving per-computation fairness: We note that in the protocol
described in Section 4.4, honest source end hosts only solve a single compu-
tational puzzle per ow. This may not result in per computation fairness,
since the honest node's computational resources may be under-utilized. We
mitigate this problem as follows: when the honest source end hosts obtain
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an active IP address for the destination end host (after solving a computa-
tional puzzle), they continue to spend additional computational resources,
which can be used to derive new active destination IP addresses (by query-
ing for and solving another puzzle). This modication in our protocol results
in per-computation fair allocation of resources. We now discuss how source
end hosts can load balance their trac over all available active IP addresses.
To switch between available active IP addresses, the JavaScript mechanism
discussed above could fetch each image or object in the page via a dierent
active IP address. For larger objects, the JavaScript could make multiple
requests for particular byte ranges of the content, and assemble the returned
contents to form the requested page.
Handling hopping interval transitions: Design of hopping interval is re-
lated to security and maintenance of a connection: While long hopping inter-
val induces security vulnerability for network scanning attack, short hopping
interval may break an existing connection. In Mirage, we suggest setting
the hopping interval to 5 minutes. To understand why we use 5 minutes,
consider two attack scenarios: (a) the size of botnet owned by the attacker
is 20; 000 (the average size of modern botnets [70]) and (b) the size of the
botnet is 1 million nodes (an extreme scenario). Now, if the bots have 1Mbps
links to their provider, each bot would be able to send only about 225 ping
packets over the 5 minute interval. Thus, in the two attack scenarios, the
attacker would only be able to scan an insignicant fraction of the range of
IP addresses for an end host - 2 28 and 2 23 respectively. A majority of web
trac ows in the Internet are short-lived [71], and will nish within a single
hopping interval. For scenarios where a short-lived ow starts close to the
hopping point, and for long-lived ows, observe that the JavaScript applet is
already solving computational puzzles continuously, to achieve per computa-
tion fairness. Based on our assumption of loose time synchronization among
end hosts, the JavaScript can start to solve the puzzles for the next time
period and thus receive uninterrupted service. To prevent unnecessary loss
in this scenario, the destination continues to receive trac on the old set of
IP addresses (from the previous hopping interval) for a time threshold.
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4.5.3 Network
Filtering trac: The destination (victim) end host's upstream routers
need to lter trac to all non-active IP addresses for the victim. We propose
two strategies for ltering trac, both of which use existing router inter-
faces. The rst strategy is to use an IRSCP-like [69] management server
within the destination's upstream AS. The destination end host could com-
municate its list of active IP addresses to the management server, and the
management server could instruct routers to drop trac to the remaining
non-active IP addresses via iBGP routing updates.2 Alternatively, the man-
agement server could push conguration les containing ACLs for ltered IP
addresses to routers. We now discuss how big the ACL should be to support
our protocol. Suppose that the local network is under a DoS attack, and that
network supports hundreds of thousands of users within the time duration
of the hopping interval (set to 5 minutes), typical of large data center envi-
ronments [72]. Also suppose that we are interested in defending against a
botnet with 100 000 bots. In this scenario, it suces to install an ACL with
a few hundred thousand entries (estimated using prior usage history) at the
victim's upstream ISP (assuming that it is the bottleneck). Current routers
can already support millions of ACL entries [73], and would not need to be
upgraded in this scenario. On the other hand, to defend against larger bot-
nets, or when the deployment happens further upstream, the ACL size could
reach tens of millions of entries, in which case existing ltering mechanisms
may need to be scaled (which the operator can do by installing more memory
at the router, rather than requiring cooperation from the router vendor). We
propose an adaptive version of Mirage which can further reduce lter table
size in Section 4.9.
Fair sharing: Routers already support per-destination fair queueing, and
this option can also be manipulated by a conguration le pushed by a
management device. For example, the Cisco secure policy manager [74] can
read in high level description of policies for a network, and translate them
into low level specications. When a destination end host is under a DoS
attack, it can request its upstream AS to enable per-destination fair queueing,
which can then automatically publish the corresponding congurations to
2Note that iBGP routing updates are local to the AS and do not cause routing insta-
bility.
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routers. Alternatively, if desired, the upstream AS could eliminate the need
for a policy manager device by leaving fair queuing always enabled for the
customer (some ISPs already run similar QoS mechanisms to improve service
for their customers and their own trac). Finally, we note that our design
does not require perfect fair queueing. Thus various trac monitors located
in the upstream AS could check if some active IP addresses are receiving
more trac than others, and if so, then push either a iBGP routing update
or an ACL update to block those active IP addresses.
Supporting IPv4: Mirage is ideally suited for IPv6, given IPv6's large
address space. While implementing our architecture in IPv4 has some chal-
lenges, it is feasible. We consider multiple scenarios for IPv4. In the rst
scenario, the source end host supports only IPv4, but the destination server
and its upstream provider (which is most likely to do ltering) support IPv6.
In this case, the source end hosts need to run an IPv4-IPv6 translator, but
the network continues to function as before. We note that Teredo IPv6 tun-
neling [65] is built into Windows and is available on Linux and Mac OS
X.
In the second scenario, the source end host supports only IPv4 and the
destination end host's network provider also supports only IPv4. We propose
that in this scenario, the destination end host can set up a tunnel to another
remote IPv6 provider. To prevent attackers from targeting its IPv4 address,
the destination end host can request its local provider to lter all access to its
IPv4 address (except from its IPv6 tunnel). Now, the victim can advertise
its IPv6 address and perform IP address hopping as before. As in the above
scenario, source end hosts use an IPv4-IPv6 translator, and the network does
not need any software or hardware updates. Alternatively, the victim server
could purchase service directly from an IPv6-enabled provider.
4.6 Evaluation
In this section, we quantify the attack resilience of Mirage using a prototype
implementation and an ns-2 simulation and compare Mirage with other DoS
defenses.
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(a) Prototype implementation architec-
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Figure 4.3: Prototype implementation.
4.6.1 Prototype Implementation
To evaluate Mirage's performance and deployability, we built a prototype
implementation of Mirage. We did not attempt to optimize the prototype
system; rather, our goal is to verify the design and evaluate its deployability.
To evaluate our prototype, we constructed a Mirage-enabled web service,
which we call the victim server, and congured a set of clients to access that
web service.
Client side: We implemented the JavaScript program described in Sec-
tion 4.5.2 to enable the client to \hop" addresses without requiring changes
to the browser or operating system running at the client. This JavaScript
program is located at the puzzle server as shown in Figure 4.3(a). When the
DNS server directs a client to the puzzle server, the client fetches and solves
the puzzle by running the JavaScript code provided by the puzzle server.
These operations are transparent to the user; the user simply directs its web
browser to the victim's domain name.
Server side: The server-side components, comprised of the victim server,
router, DNS server, and puzzle server, provide transparent protection for a
victim server. By transparent, we mean that the user of a client machine
need not install any additional software.
We used BIND [75] to implement the DNS server. We dened our own
zone (miragev6.org) and created a probing tool that regularly sends pings to
the victim server to detect when the victim server is under attack. Initially,
www.miragev6.org resolves directly to the victim's IP address. Once the
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probing tool fails to receive a certain number of echo responses, it changes
the DNS record so that http://www.miragev6.org resolves to the puzzle
server's IP address (which, in our prototype, is the DNS server). We set the
TTL for the DNS record to a small value so that an entry cached before the
victim was under attack will be quickly corrected once the victim is under
attack.
When the victim is under DoS attack and the client tries to access http:
//www.miragev6.org, the client receives the IP address of the puzzle server.
The client connects to the puzzle server and fetches a piece of JavaScript
which includes a puzzle. Our implementation uses the scheme in Section 4.5.1,
using AES as the encryption algorithm.
Experimental setup: To investigate Mirage's operation in the wide-area,
we conducted experiments in the Internet using the PlanetLab testbed. Fig-
ure 4.3(b) shows how we set up the network. We selected random (lightly
CPU-loaded) nodes to run our experiments. We selected one PlanetLab node
to act as the client, and one PlanetLab node to run the server, router, puz-
zler server, and DNS software. Since PlanetLab hosts do not directly provide
IPv6 compatibility, for our IPv6 experiments we used an IPv4 encapsulated
tunnel. We found that standard tunnel (e.g. GRE) packets are blocked by
rewalls of some PlanetLab networks, so we used UDP tunnels for our exper-
iments. We implemented this tunnel with the TUN [76] virtual interface and
Click [77]. In an IPv6-enabled machine, outgoing IPv6 packets are delivered
to TUN device which lets Click capture the packets. Click then encapsulates
the packets with UDP tunnel. Because PlanetLab nodes lack kernel support
for IPv6, we assigned IPv4 addresses to the TUN device and used Click to
translate between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
4.6.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate how well Mirage can defend against possible
attacks. We do not argue that we consider all possible attacks; rather, our
intention is to quantify Mirage's attack resilience. We consider two attacks:
one that exhausts network bandwidth and one that exhausts hopping IP
addresses.
Bandwidth exhaustion attack: By increasing its sending rate, or by
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Figure 4.4: Mirage guarantees normal users' throughput even with
high-rate attackers.
increasing the number of ows it sends, an attacker can increase its trac
rate to overwhelm normal users' trac. We examined the eect of the attack
trac rate on benign trac by setting up ten benign TCP trac ows and
one UDP attack trac ow that share a single bottleneck link to the vic-
tim. We measured the throughput of the benign and the attack trac, and
compared their throughputs with and without Mirage. Figure 4.4 shows the
results when we vary the attack trac rate between 0.5 and 1.3 times the
bandwidth of the bottleneck link. Without Mirage, as the attack trac rate
increases, the normal user's trac rate decreases; however, in Mirage, fair
queueing drops the attackers' excess packets rather than the normal user's
trac.
Hopping IP address exhaustion attack: Since Mirage uses fair queueing
per hopping IP address, an attacker can request a large number of hopping
IP addresses to prevent normal users from getting hopping IP addresses,
thus preventing normal users from transmitting to the victim. In order to
evaluate Mirage's performance under a large number of attackers, we use the
ns-2 simulator [16]. To parametrize the simulation, we developed a computa-
tional model and used Internet experiments using a small number of attacker
processes to estimate the parameters for our model.
Our Internet experiments used three machines to behave as an attacker
and one machine to behave as the normal user. We implemented a client
using C code to access the Mirage-enabled web service. To demonstrate the
performance of our JavaScript extension, we also considered Firefox to be the
client. Both normal users and attackers solve puzzles as quickly as possible
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Figure 4.5: Defense against hopping IP address exhaustion attack: client is
implemented by C code.
in order to obtain hopping addresses; however, in normal user machines,
a client process generates IP addresses, whereas in attacker machines, we
vary the number of client processes that are generating IP addresses. In
our prototype implementation, the puzzle server uses hopping IP addresses
released from a leaky bucket and assigns them to the puzzle solution with
the highest diculty. A process that is not chosen will increase its puzzle
diculty and try again. Without Mirage, the puzzle server grants all requests
for IP addresses. We measured the number of hopping IP addresses obtained
by the attacker machines and the normal user machine. Figure 4.5(a) and
Figure 4.6(a) show the ratio of the number of hopping IP addresses per
attacker machine to the number of hopping IP addresses of normal user
machine when we use C code and Firefox as a client respectively. Without
Mirage, as the number of attacker processes increases, the attacker machines
can get a larger number of hopping IP addresses, which corresponds to a
large number of victim machine accesses. Note that for Firefox processes, the
growth rate becomes smaller as the number of processes increases because the
additional processes will saturate the machine's computational power. We
can see that with C code, the saturation of computation power is reduced.
With Mirage, this computational limit is reached much more quickly, because
a node's ability to get IP addresses is computationally limited.
We used this experimental data to establish a model in ns-2. We used
a dumbbell topology with RTT equal to that from our experimental study.
When a node solves a puzzle solution, it takes an amount of time to generate
a solution given by B+NE
C
where B is the cost (in cycles) of running a client
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Figure 4.6: Defense against hopping IP address exhaustion attack: Firefox
is the client.
process without puzzle calculations, N represents the number of encryption
attempts needed to solve a puzzle, which we model as a normal distribution,
E is the number of cycles taken by each encryption attempt, and C is the
speed of the CPU. Without Mirage, a node takes time B=C to resolve the
victim's IP address. We varied the values of B, N , and E to nd parameters
that best matched our experimental study; that is, ones that minimized the
variance between experimental and simulation results. Figure 4.5(a) and
Figure 4.6(a) show how well the two sets of data match.
With these simulation parameters, we performed simulation studies to
show how the number of attacker processes aects the number of hopping IP
addresses that the attacker machine obtained. Figure 4.5(b), Figure 4.5(c),
Figure 4.6(b) and Figure 4.6(c) show the results when the number of at-
tacking machines is 3 and 30, respectively. We vary the number of attacker
processes from 3 to 30000. In all cases, we can see that with Mirage, an
attacker cannot obtain as many hopping IP addresses as in the case without
Mirage. Note that the attacker performance dips beyond a threshold number
of attacker processes due to resource constraints at the attacker machines.
4.6.3 Comparative Study
We compare the eectiveness of dierent DoS defense mechanisms: Pha-
lanx [57], TVA [31] and Mirage, using the ns-2 simulator. For Phalanx, we
developed ns-2 code and for TVA, we used the code developed by authors
of TVA. For Mirage, we used DRR as our fair queueing mechanism. We
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Figure 4.7: Comparative study varying link bandwidth.
followed the methodology in the work of Liu et al. [32]. We used the IPv4
Routed /24 Topology Dataset [50] to derive the AS-level topology, which
has links annotated with round trip times at each hop. We scaled down the
AS-level topology by 1/200 since the memory of our simulation machine does
not support the full Internet-scale AS-topology. In our simulated environ-
ment, ten legitimate TCP senders try to send 50 les each, of size 2KB. Each
sender immediately starts sending a le after its previous le transfer is done.
We measured the fraction of successful le transfers and the average time to
deliver les. While legitimate senders send TCP trac, attackers send UDP
trac. All legitimate and attacker trac goes through the same bottleneck
link to a destination. For the rst simulation, we intended 10K attackers
in the Internet-scale. Hence in our simulation scaled down, the number of
simulated attackers is 50, and each attacker sends 10Kbps of UDP trac.
Figure 4.7 shows results when we vary the bottleneck link bandwidth from
300Kbps to 520Kbps. For the second simulation, we vary the number of
attackers from 5 to 500, xing the bottleneck link bandwidth as 500Kbps.
Figure 4.8 shows the results in this case. Overall, we nd that Mirage achieves
its deployment benets without substantial costs in performance, achieving
comparable results to Phalanx and TVA across a variety of attack strengths.
4.7 Deployment
Like previous DoS mitigation schemes, our design requires changes to certain
components within the network. However, our work diers from \clean slate"
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Figure 4.8: Comparative study varying number of attackers.
approaches which require large-scale changes to the Internet infrastructure to
achieve their benets. In particular, our experimental results show that only
the victim server's local network and its upstream ISP can deploy Mirage to
defend against moderate scale attacks. Moreover, Mirage is incentive com-
patible. Since the victim has a business relationship with its upstream ISP,
this may spur economic benets for adoption [78]. Incrementally deploying
Mirage at ISPs that are further upstream increases Mirage's resilience against
attack. Mirage requires the following modications to existing systems:
ADNS: Mirage requires changes to the server's authoritative DNS server,
to redirect clients to the puzzle server, which can be hosted by existing ser-
vices such as Akamai or Amazon S3. Since the authoritative DNS server is
typically owned and operated by the service provider, many deployed sys-
tems (e.g., Akamai) leverage the ADNS as an easy-to-modify location to
instrument their designs.
Server: Mirage can be deployed as a bump in the wire solution at the server;
existing software does not need to be modied. For example, Mirage software
can simply bind the server's hopping IP addresses to 0:0:0:0. Alternately,
Mirage can also be deployed as a reverse proxy.
Server's upstream network(s): Mirage also requires changes to net-
works. However, Mirage does not require widespread adoption in order for
servers to benet. Changes to network infrastructure that is under direct
inuence of the service provider, such as its own network, and ISPs that it
directly pays for service, suce to defend against moderate scale attacks. In
addition, these network changes do not rely on router vendors to incorpo-
89
Table 4.1: In-network support requirements for DoS defense schemes.
Mechanism Mirage NetFence [34] TVA [31] Phalanx [57]
Filtering IP dest
based
Capability
based
Capability
based
Capability
based
Router communica-
tion
Out of
band
New header New header New header
Fair queuing/rate
limiting
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Puzzle distribution Yes No No (at-
tack [33])
Yes
Bandwidth-based
fairness
No No No Yes
Router Cryptogra-
phy
No Yes Yes No
Other None Passport Path identi-
ers
Trac for-
warding via
overlay net-
work
rate new changes into their software, and can instead be realized through
conguration changes. However, depending on the point of deployment, the
ACL mechanism may need to be scaled (which can be done by the operator
by installing more memory), rather than needing to convince the vendor to
change the router's hardware/software design. These conguration changes
can be automated through the use of an IRSCP [69] to install ACLs within
the network. Mirage can alternatively leverage OpenFlow, with Mirage's
functionality implemented within the NOX controller. Several large ISPs
have already begun oering commercial services to allow customers to install
prexes for blacklist ltering [79].
4.7.1 Comparison with Other Approaches
In this section, we contrast the deployment challenges of Mirage with those
of previous proposals, in terms of what changes need to be made to the
infrastructure (network primitives), and which players in the network need
to instrument those changes (administrative boundaries).
Adding new primitives to the network: Deploying new functional-
ity in the network becomes easier when the changes to existing devices are
small. Protocols that require new primitives in routers require coordination
with (and across) network vendors to be realized. Table 4.1 shows the type
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Table 4.2: Aected deployment locations for DoS defense schemes.
Deployment details Mirage NetFence [34] TVA [31] Phalanx [57]
Source upgrades Optional Required Required Optional
Destination upgrades Required Required Required Required
Bottleneck router(s)
upgrades
Required Required Required Required
Other router(s) up-
grades
None Yes Yes Yes (Overlay
Participa-
tion)
Puzzle distribution Akamai/DNS None None (at-
tack)
Akamai/DNS
Router upgrade type Conguration
changes
(may need
more mem-
ory)
Software and
hardware
changes
(by vendors)
Software and
hardware
changes
(by vendors)
Software and
hardware
changes
(by vendors)
Other None None None Overlay net-
work
of changes required to network devices to deploy several recently-proposed
DoS mitigation schemes. First, NetFence, TVA, and Phalanx perform l-
tering based on some form of a capability. This requires modications to
the software of Internet routers to process and modify this capability. In
contrast, Mirage performs ltering based on the destination IP address, and
communicates ACL entries to routers using legacy protocols (iBGP feeds or
conguration changes via sessions to an IRSCP). Next, Mirage and Phalanx
require computational puzzles (proof of work) in order to defend against
attacks targeting the request channels. TVA does not use computational
puzzles, but this makes it vulnerable to the Denial of Capability (DoC) at-
tack [33]. NetFence requires defenses to prevent the IP spoong attack (such
as Passport) to be widely deployed in order to secure the request channel.
In addition to computation-based fairness using computational puzzles, Pha-
lanx also implicitly adopts bandwidth-based fairness [59], an approach which
is known to induce congestion collapse in the network. Finally, the non-
Mirage mechanisms require additional functionality from the network, such
as 1) cryptography at the routers for NetFence and TVA, 2) insertion of
path identiers for TVA, and 3) overlay network to absorb the DoS attack
for Phalanx.
Deploying changes across administrative boundaries: Deploying new
functionality in the network becomes easier when fewer participants have to
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cooperate in deploying those changes. Protocols that require clients to install
new software, or that require widespread upgrades to routers, can complicate
deployment. Table 4.2 describes the location where changes would need to
be realized within the network. First, only Mirage and Phalanx do not re-
quire source hosts to upgrade. Second, all mechanisms require destinations
to upgrade, and also require deployment at the bottleneck routers (points
of congestion). However, TVA and NetFence also require other routers to
upgrade, for inserting path identiers and for defending against IP spoong;
this means that it is not possible for an ISP to unilaterally deploy NetFence.
Similarly, Phalanx also requires either an external overlay network to absorb
the DoS attack, or additional routers to upgrade and participate in the over-
lay scheme. Finally, Mirage and Phalanx require an additional deployment
component to distribute puzzles. However, we note that puzzle distribution
in Mirage and Phalanx does not require global cooperation from ISPs. A
Victim end host can easily use existing CDNs like Akamai, which can be
given nancial incentives to participate. Finally, we note that Mirage is the
only scheme in which functionality required from the routers is already de-
ployed in today's routers, though this functionality (ACLs) may need to be
scaled depending on the point of deployment. Routers already have support
for ACLs and fair queuing, which can be enabled with relatively straightfor-
ward conguration commands. Scaling memory requirements for ACLs can
be done by the operator by installing more memory at the router, rather
than requiring router vendor's cooperation.
4.8 Scalable Design
In this section, we discuss the scalability of our original Mirage design and
propose solutions. Since an access rule at a router corresponds to a sin-
gle client in Mirage, the allowed number of access rules at a router limits
how many clients a Mirage system supports. The number of access rules
supported by a router depends on specic type of the router. For example,
while Juniper T1600 series, designed for core router, are claimed to sup-
port hundreds of thousands rules at line-rate, we realized by experiment that
Pronto 3240, designed for access router, could support only about 2000 rules.
We address this scalability issue by proposing a way to increase the number
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Figure 4.9: Examples showing tradeo between scalability and security.
of clients that a system supports, sacricing some security properties rather
than leaving this issue as a network operation issue which leads to purchasing
more expensive router for scalable solution. We call Mirage with our scalable
mechanism transition Mirage.
Basic idea. Figure 4.9 shows the trade-o of designs considering scalability
and security. Figure 4.9(a) shows a design for strong security and sacriced
scalability where each access rule species both the prex of a server and a
sux which is unique to the Mirage system. Figure 4.9(b) shows a design
for strong scalability and sacriced security where each access rule species
only a sux shared by all servers. Figure 4.9(c) shows an in-between design
where, at rst, access rules specifying prexes lter and fair-queue ows, and
then access rules specifying suxes shared by servers lter and fair-queue
ows. We call the design oriented towards only scalability transition Mirage
and the in-between design secure transition Mirage. Until now, we did not
dene exactly what we mean by scalability and security for our designs.
We elaborate those two concepts and compare between dierent designs in
following discussion.
Scalability. We now quantify the scalability of each Mirage design with
a simple model where a router can accommodate r access rules. Assuming
that each server uses k suxes on average, we can calculate the number of
supportable servers in original Mirage as r
k
. For secure transition Mirage,
the number of supportable servers is r   k. However, in transition Mirage,
the number of supportable servers does not depend on the number of access
rules in a router. Figure 4.10(a) shows the results when r is equal to 2000.
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Security model. We now present security models for our dierent designs:
original Mirage, transition Mirage and secure transition Mirage. The way
we present security models is that we explain an attack scenario which can
be defended by original Mirage but cannot be defended by transition Mirage
and then we quantify the attack's eect with a simple model. Such an attack
highlights the dierence of security models in our Mirage designs. The main
dierence between original Mirage and (secure) transition Mirage is that in
(secure) transition Mirage, servers share the same suxes. Hence, if a ma-
licious server in transition Mirage shares the set of suxes with colluding
clients, the colluding clients can ood packets to other servers. To quantify
the eect of this attack, we establish a system model where n servers are be-
hind a router. In this model, our main purpose is to calculate the maximally
possible deviation from fair shares that attackers can induce. We assume
that there are the same number of attackers and benign users and they have
the same computational powers. This assumption is not based on practical
scenario but is used for easy calculation of the deviation from fairness. With
this assumption, the attackers and benign users are supposed to have the
same number (s) of suxes. We assume that attackers attempt to attack all
n servers. With the obtained suxes, attackers are assumed to ood packets
by the maximum possible amount since we are interested in maximally pos-
sible deviation from fairness. With this model, we now calculate the ratio
of attackers' bandwidth share to the total share for each Mirage design. In
original Mirage, the attackers cannot know other servers' suxes. Hence,
attackers can get just a half of the total bandwidth. In secure transition
Mirage, attackers can use s suxes for each server and benign users use s=n
suxes for each server. Hence, the ratio of attackers' share to total share
is s
s+ s
n
= n
n+1
. In transition Mirage, since there is no fair queueing between
servers, attackers can occupy the whole bandwidth for servers. Figure 4.10(b)
pictorially shows our analysis to see the attack eect in terms of the number
of victim servers.
Implementation. Figure 4.11 shows how we can implement transition Mi-
rage. Compared to original Mirage, a specialized server called manager is
added. While in original Mirage, each server can manage its own active ad-
dresses; in transition Mirage, active addresses should be shared by multiple
servers. The manager server takes care of servers' sharing active addresses.
In particular, the manager server maintains actives addresses, related puzzles
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Figure 4.11: Implementation of transition Mirage.
and the set of servers sharing active addresses. Even though this function-
ality can be added in a router, our design avoids a new implementation to a
router due to diculty of updating a router. When a server needs an active
address to handle a client's request for a connection, the server requests the
manager server to return an active address and a related puzzle. Getting
them from the manager server, the server forwards them to a puzzle server
to distribute a puzzle to a client. When the manager server gets the re-
quest for a new active address from a server, it examines whether there is
already an active address not shared to the requesting server. In that case,
the manager server does not generate a new active address: rather, it re-
turns a shared active address to the requesting server. When in the manager
server, there is no active address that the requesting server is not using, the
manager server generates a new puzzle and corresponding active address as
in original Mirage. In this case, the manager server installs a new access rule
to a router.
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Need for attack detection. Figure 4.10 shows a limitation of secure tran-
sition Mirage: secure transition Mirage is not so scalable when the number of
suxes used by a server is large. For this case, we propose to use transition
Mirage with an attack detection scheme.
Detection of a malicious server. We start our discussion by dening
attack recognition. For reminder, the attack that we consider is that collud-
ing clients use suxed revealed by a colluding server to increase its trac
rate to other servers. When manager server lets n servers use a common
sux, the expected trac rate to one of the n servers is the capacity al-
located to the sux divided by n. Manager server checks if actual trac
rate to each server is larger than the expected trac rate. If it is, manager
server supposes that there is a malicious server among servers sharing the
sux. We call the group of servers possibly having a malicious server a sus-
pected group. Suxes shared by a suspected group are not revealed to other
servers out of the suspected group. The basic idea of our detection scheme
is to adaptively reduce the suspected group size by dividing the suspected
group into separate groups and checking trac to each server included in
the separate groups. When manager server recognizes an attack in one of
the divided group, that group becomes a suspected group. This procedure
repeats until a malicious server is found. During the process of reducing sus-
pected group size, an attacker can attempt to send trac to servers not in
a suspected group without knowing which servers share a revealed sux. In
this case, manager server immediately considers corresponding group having
the revealed sux a suspected group.
Figure 4.12(a) illustrates what we have just described. In this example, we
construct a balanced binary tree and associate each leaf to each server. An
internal node, presented as a circle in the gure, represents a group which
includes servers associated to descendant leaves of the internal node. A box
with dashed line embraces a selected group for sharing suxes. Since ev-
ery sux in transition Mirage is initially shared by every router, the rst
selected group is the root node which includes every server. When an at-
tack is detected, manager server divides the group into two dierent groups
represented by two children nodes of the root node. Since the attacker in
this example is in the right child node, an attack is detected in the associ-
ated group. And the left child node of the root node will not be divided.
For the right child node, the same procedure will repeat until an attacker
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server is detected. In this version of detection, manager server divides an
internal node to two children nodes of the internal node upon detection of
an attack. The benet of doing so is that a sux can be shared by as many
servers as possible, thereby maintaining scalability during detection process.
While this design can be considered scalable, the detection process can be
slow. Figure 4.12(b) shows a design which makes the detection process fast,
sacricing scalability. The main dierence from the scalable version is that
upon detection of an attack, manager server divides a group to more than
two smaller groups.
We now analyze these detection schemes with a model where a balanced
binary tree like Figure 4.12 is used. For the convenience of analysis, we
assume that there are 2ns servers (ns 2 N) and there is one attacker among
them. For the analysis on the detection speed, we assume that it takes on
average ds seconds to detect an attack in a group. With this model, we
analyze detection speed and scalability of our two detection schemes. In
scalable detection, groups are broken ns times until the detection of the
attacker where ns can be interpreted as the depth of the binary tree. Hence,
it takes ns(ds+1) seconds on average to detect an attacker. In fast detection,
it just takes ds+1 seconds to detect an attacker. For scalability, we calculate
the maximally necessary number of suxes. In scalable detection, it is ns+1
since there is a single internal node at each level except for level ns and there
are two servers at level ns. In fast detection, it is 2
ns which is the number of
servers.
4.9 Discussion
Here, we discuss some ramications of our design.
Adaptive network defense: To improve performance under small and
moderate sized attacks, we describe an adaptive mechanism that utilizes
network support in proportion to the strength of the attack. In particular,
we organize the active set of IP addresses as a binary tree, with nodes in the
tree representing IP addresses, and the number of leaves equaling the number
of potential clients. Levels in the tree represent priorities: IP addresses at
level i are assigned half the priority as compared to IP addresses at level
i+1. We modify our puzzle server to return multiple IP addresses, one from
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Figure 4.12: Detection schemes.
each level in the tree. Source end hosts rst try the IP address corresponding
to the root of the tree (level 0), and if they are unable to get good service,
they adaptively switch to the next level in the binary tree. This has the
advantage that the router only needs to maintain per aggregate state in the
access control lists while performing fair queuing. Similarly, the ACL entries
could also be added adaptively by the destination end host - it starts o
by adding the root of the tree, and then progressively adding next level IP
addresses as needed. This would lead to a reduction in the ACL list size.
Authorized users and prioritized services: We can extend our architec-
ture to enable destination end hosts to provide higher priority to authorized
users. Firstly, victim servers could communicate private IP addresses to au-
thorized users using out-of-band communications. Secondly, authorized users
could use Mirage to authenticate to the victim server and receive private IP
addresses, or hints to solve computational puzzles. Finally, authorized users
could authenticate themselves to the puzzle servers, using a server-supplied
cookie (possibly cached from last visit by the browser). The authentica-
tion could be performed in zero knowledge, with no information about client
credentials being revealed to the puzzle server. Upon authentication, the
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puzzle server could provide either private IP addresses or hints for puzzle
to the authorized users. We note that our architecture can enable a useful
scenario where a sensitive server's IP address is visible only to authorized
users. Here, the server would need to supply the cookie to authorized users
via an out of band channel, and the puzzle server would respond only after
authentication. The server's IP address is practically invisible to the rest of
the Internet, and is thus largely immune to threats like bot infections due to
random IP scanning.
Insider collusion attacks: A potential concern in Mirage is the collusion
between a compromised end host in the victim network and the attacker.
Suppose that the victim network has two nodes. The compromised end host
could install an ACL at the upstream AS with k entries, with the attackers
having full knowledge of the active IP addresses for the compromised host.
The attackers could then send trac to the k IP addresses listed in the
ACL. Due to per destination fair queueing at the upstream routers, the
attackers would gain an overwhelming share of the trac at the victim link
and DoS the honest end host. In practice, the operator can deal with this
through appropriate network management. One management policy to solve
the problem could be to bound the size of the ACL per victim.
Prex/path/location hopping: While our design focuses on hopping
of IP addresses, it may be possible to apply this technique to other com-
ponents of network protocols. For example, it may be possible to perform
prex hopping, by having router prexes changing with time, path hopping,
by changing the set of Internet paths used to route to a destination, and
location hopping, by leveraging virtual machine migration techniques to relo-
cate services on-demand in the presence of a denial of service attack. These
techniques may assist in providing improved security properties in present
and future Internet architectures.
4.10 Summary
Mirage uses an analog of frequency hopping from wireless networks: hosts
vary their IP address through a pseudorandom sequence to evade attacks by
unauthorized hosts. From theoretical analysis, simulations, and experiments
from a prototype implementation, we nd that Mirage achieves compara-
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ble performance to previous DoS mitigation mechanisms. However, Mirage
has improved deployment properties over previous designs. Mirage does not
require an external overlay network, or a trusted Internet authority, or de-
fenses against IP spoong. In particular, Mirage is incrementally deployable;
a victim server and its upstream ISP can deploy Mirage and defend against
moderate scale attacks, without requiring source end hosts to install any
software.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have explored three aspects of secure resource manage-
ment. First, I presented an analysis of the impact of false feedback attacks on
the performance of channel-aware protocols in wireless networks. We found
that a fair scheduler mitigates the impact of false feedback attack but can-
not achieve the possible maximum system throughput. To address the issue,
we proposed a secure channel estimation scheme. Our simulation showed
that our scheme enables a system to achieve better throughput than fair
scheduler while maintaining attack-resilience. Second, we proposed a DoS
defense architecture against colluding link-ooding attackers. I presented a
strawman design to emulate TCP operations and CRAFT design to resolve
memory overhead of the strawman design. Our prototype implementation
showed that CRAFT could be feasibly implemented on a commodity PC and
our simulation showed that CRAFT was an eective solution for colluding
attacks in partial deployment scenario. Third, I presented Mirage, a DoS de-
fense architecture deployable in an incentive-compatible manner. The design
goal of Mirage is that other ASes are not required to deploy Mirage for an
adopter to get some security benet. Our prototype implementation using
PlanetLab showed that Mirage is feasible in the Internet. Our comparative
simulation showed that the eectiveness of Mirage is comparable to other
DoS defense architectures.
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